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The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health:
Lessons From a Century of Cigarettes
JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN
Toxic torts is a relatively new area of the law, but its seeds were sown
a century ago with developments in modern culture. The design,
manufacture, and marketing of the cigarette constituted one such
development, one with far-reaching legal consequences which continue to
challenge the legal system today. This Article is built around Allan M.
Brandt’s 2007 public health history of cigarettes, The Cigarette Century.
It uses Brandt’s book as a stepping stone to a broader discussion of
current critical issues in toxic tort law. The Article begins with a review of
the book, then moves into a discussion of the ways in which the watershed
events in law and science that surrounded the cigarette in the twentieth
century have shaped the major legal issues in toxic tort law today. In
conducting this anlysis, I focus on the three major areas of toxic tort law:
scientific causation, preemption, and mass toxic tort litigation. I
demonstrate that the public health history of cigarettes offers many lessons
for judges, attorneys, and legal scholars in addressing the most troubling
issues that arise in toxic tort litigation.
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The Synergy of Toxic Tort Law and Public Health:
Lessons From a Century of Cigarettes
JEAN MACCHIAROLI EGGEN∗

AA lawyer without history . . . is a mechanic.@
-Sir Walter Scott, 1815
I. INTRODUCTION
The study and practice of law are becoming increasingly
interdisciplinary. Toxic tort law embodies this trend with its merger of law
and science. Toxic tort litigation typically requires attorneys and judges to
display a sophisticated understanding of science, rendering legal doctrine
only part of a complicated picture that focuses on the interplay of federal
and state regulations with the common law. Indeed, toxic tort law
represents the quintessential merger of public regulation and private law.1
Rarely does a tort action involving toxic exposures begin and end with the
common law. Rather, most toxic litigation typically invokes an array of
regulatory measures based upon scientific studies that have emerged over
time with varying degrees of reliability. The result has been that both toxic
tort law and the regulation of toxic substances have evolved in
unpredictable and synergistic ways.2
Nowhere is the tension between public and private law more evident
than in the area of consumer products, due to the availability,
desirability,and potential hazard of many products to the consuming

∗
Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law; member, Widener Health Law Institute.
The author wishes to thank Laura Ray and John Culhane for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft
of this article, and Janet Lindenmuth for technical support.
1
See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 383, 385 (2007)
(“Toxic torts, in contrast to traditional torts, consistently present mixed issues of private and public
law.”); Allan Kanner, Toxic Tort Litigation in a Regulatory World, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 535, 536 (2002)
(discussing “the importance of a continuing role for toxic tort litigation in a world increasingly
dominated by the public law”).
2
One classic example of this synergy relates to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000), known as the
“Superfund” statute, enacted by Congress in 1980. Congress considered, but expressly declined to
include, provisions for compensation of persons who claimed injuries from releases of hazardous
substances into the environment. Instead, such claimants were left to seek whatever remedies may be
available under the common law. Id. § 9659(h) (2000). CERCLA contains a citizens’ suit provision,
id. § 9659, which provides only for injunctive relief and civil penalties. See id. § 9659(c) (2000) (“The
district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to order such action as may be necessary to correct the
violation, and to impose any civil penalty provided for the violation.”).
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public. In The Cigarette Century, Allan M. Brandt, the Amalie Moses
Kass Professor of the History of Medicine at Harvard Medical School and
professor in the Department of the History of Science at Harvard
University,4 has written a comprehensive public health history of the
paradigmatic American consumer product of the twentieth century. While
other histories of tobacco5 and the tobacco industry6 have been published
over the years, The Cigarette Century, a massive and well-documented
600-page tome, is unique in its intense focus on the broad public health
impact and legal implications of the cigarette, a relatively late entry into
the tobacco industry’s arsenal of products, and in its author’s status as a
scholar of the history of public health. Brandt has analyzed a century of
cigarette production, marketing, and litigation in the United States and,
more recently, globally, and has concluded that the tobacco industry has
perpetrated the “crime of the century” on the public.7
Although The Cigarette Century focuses exclusively on the tobacco
industry, its value extends far beyond the legal and public health
implications of a single product. Indeed, perhaps its greatest value is in
illuminating the public health issues, and related legal issues, presented by
toxic substances generally. The history of the cigarette embodies the
developing tensions between the regulatory and judicial regimes, and the
legal struggles sparked by the cigarette have served as a prototype for
ongoing legal battles in other areas of toxic tort law.
Traditionally, tort law and public regulation have served separate
purposes. Tort law is a remedial regime that exists to compensate persons
who have suffered legally cognizable injuries.8 While compensation is its
most frequently articulated goal, the tort system serves a complex
collection of other policy goals. Chief among these goals is deterrence of
future harmful conduct through restraints, financial or otherwise, imposed
upon liable defendants by the judicial system. In contrast, regulation of
potentially toxic substances principally has sought to prevent injuries from
occurring in the first instance. Statutes such as the Toxic Substances
Control Act,9 the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,10 and the Occupational
3
See generally ALLAN M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA (2007).
4
The Cigarette Century: About the Author, http://www.cigarettecentury.com/author.html (last
visited Sept. 12, 2008).
5
See, e.g., IAIN GATELY, TOBACCO: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF HOW AN EXOTIC PLANT SEDUCED
CIVILIZATION (2001); see also SMOKE: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF SMOKING (Sander L. Gilman & Zhou
Xun eds., 2004) (examining the cultural history of smoking worldwide).
6
See generally RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996).
7
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 493.
8
Kanner, supra note 1, at 542.
9
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2000). TSCA includes a
statement that “adequate authority should exist to regulate chemical substances and mixtures which
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Safety and Health Act exemplify federal regulatory efforts to prevent
health or environmental hazards from causing harm. The regulatory
approach is founded upon the aspirational notion of democratic decisions
achieved through a governmental process that makes use of agency
expertise of unimpeachable neutrality.12 Yet, substantial tension exists
between the role of the government and the role of the courts in matters
related to toxic exposures. The Cigarette Century documents that tension
in the context of the battle between the public health community and the
tobacco industry.13 Cigarettes in many ways serve as a microcosm of the
world of toxic torts, and Brandt has meticulously examined that
microcosm.
This Article considers the legal lessons that the cigarette offers toxic
tort litigation generally. Part II presents a general review of The Cigarette
Century as a whole. Following Part II, the remainder of this Article
focuses on the sections of the book most germane to toxic tort litigation
today and the lessons that can be gleaned from examining one toxic tort in
historical detail. Part III discusses Brandt’s observations on the revolution
in epidemiological science and public health policy in the middle of the
twentieth century as they relate to our understanding of toxic tort law. This
Article demonstrates that the legacy of that pivotal period in public health
research continues to impact, for better or worse, current toxic tort
litigation. Part IV examines another watershed event in cigarette history—
labeling regulation and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.14 Cipollone has become a mainstay of the
Supreme Court’s product preemption jurisprudence, and this Article shows
how that decision impacts toxic tort cases today. Part V addresses mass
litigation and the role played by tobacco litigation and the 1998 Master
Settlement Agreement in shaping current judicial views toward aggregative
litigation. This Article concludes that understanding the ways in which the
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment, and to take action with respect to
chemical substances and mixtures which are imminent hazards . . . .” Id. § 2601(b)(2).
10
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2000). One example of the
many safety concerns addressed by the Act is the misbranding of food, drugs, and medical devices. See
id. § 331(b) (prohibiting “[t]he adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in
interstate commerce”).
11
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000). Among the purposes and
goals of the Act was “encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of
occupational safety and health hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate employers and
employees to institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing safe and healthful working
conditions . . . .” Id. § 651(b)(1).
12
See Kanner, supra note 1, at 543 (noting that the “[the agency’s] job in the environmental area
is to eliminate conflicts or strike balance, where possible, between economic growth and the
environment”). Kanner argues that the tort system strikes a better balance in this area. See id. at 545
(contrasting the tort system to political and bureaucratic alternatives that are often influenced by narrow
interest groups).
13
See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 3, at 211.
14
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).

566

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:561

events surrounding a century of cigarettes have shaped current toxic tort
law is crucial to shaping the future.
II. THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: SCIENCE AND POPULAR CULTURE IN THE
SERVICE OF A PRODUCT
Early in The Cigarette Century, Brandt reports that “[m]ore than one in
five American adults still smoke regularly, and today tobacco still kills
more than 435,000 U.S. citizens each year (more than HIV, alcohol, illicit
drugs, suicide, and homicide combined).”15 The majority of the book is an
effort to analyze and understand the contingencies that gave rise to those
shameful statistics and that made tobacco one of the most significant
consumer products of the twentieth century.16 Brandt summarizes his
public-health approach to the subject as one that seeks “to layer temporally
those forces that serve to explain the changing dynamics of tobacco use
and the development of a massive pandemic in the twentieth century.”17
Brandt achieves this goal admirably, considering that the subject he tackles
is as sprawling as the corporate tentacles of the tobacco industry he
chronicles.
In contrast, Richard Kluger, in his excellent and comprehensive history
of the tobacco industry published in 1996, Ashes to Ashes, was concerned
more with the business and corporate history of tobacco.18 Kluger’s view
of the business is focused and microscopic, and his book is an
encyclopedic survey of the industry. Ashes to Ashes was published,
however, prior to many of the important events that have occurred in the
past decade. The Cigarette Century has the advantage of including those
events. But more significantly, Brandt, as both an insider in the public
health community and a historian, has added a new and valuable dimension
to the ignominious story of the tobacco industry. His approach to the book
as a whole combines fascinating historical observations of the watershed
moments of public health history triggered by tobacco events with a strong
measure of public health advocacy. Brandt’s The Cigarette Century is a
prism through which attorneys, judges, and legal scholars can look and
learn so as to shape the future of toxic tort law. It is therefore instructive to
15

BRANDT, supra note 3, at 13.
The cigarette is the most significant consumer product in toxic tort law. While I would argue
that asbestos is the single most significant product in toxic tort law generally, the claimants in the vast
majority of asbestos cases have been persons who were exposed in the workplace. In contrast, tobacco
products are consumer products in the sense that the products were mass marketed to the general
public. The result was that anyone could be exposed, either those actually consuming the product, or
those persons in the proximity of the consumers.
17
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 13.
18
KLUGER, supra note 6, at xix. In the Foreword, Kluger states: “The question, then, is whether
cigarette merchants are businessmen basically like any other, selling a product judged to be highly
hazardous long after its usefulness to millions was well established . . . or are they moral lepers preying
on the ignorant, the miserable, the emotionally vulnerable, and the genetically susceptible?” Id.
16
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begin with a general review of the book and its contents before embarking
upon a discussion of its special relevance to the law of toxic torts.
A. Social Factors
Brandt sets up his discussion of the public health history of cigarettes
by placing the events in their social context. He interwines his narrative of
the social context and symbology of cigarettes in the twentieth century
with the broadening quest of the public health community to uncover and
comprehend the threat cigarettes pose. Thus, Brandt begins by identifying
the social factors that gave rise to the public health crisis of smoking. The
first of these factors was the establishment, and subsequent dissolution, of
the American Tobacco Company,19 known as the “Tobacco Trust.”20
Brandt observes that following the United States Supreme Court’s 1911
decision holding that the Tobacco Trust violated the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act and ordering the dissolution of the American Tobacco
Company,21 the industry merely circled its wagons and established a
unified and secretive monolithic front.22 This move enabled the industry to
promote and market its product for a century with virtually no
governmental intrusion.
The second social factor was the transformation within American
society from moral opposition to smoking to unprecedented enthusiastic
acceptance of a product with known hazards.23 When American society
began to shed the Victorian attitudes that were embodied in the temperance
movement, youth and women became avid consumers of cigarettes.24 For
America’s youth, the cigarette represented adulthood and rebellion; for
women, freedom from the strictures of a society that had prevented them

19

At its inception, the American Tobacco Company accounted for ninety percent of all sales of
cigarettes in the United States. BRANDT, supra note 3, at 34.
20
The Tobacco Trust operated as a monopoly, restricting competition, consolidating the industry,
and developing a marketing network. Id. at 34–37.
21
United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181–82, 187–88 (1911).
22
Brandt notes that in the immediate aftermath of this ruling, the industry continued to operate in
essentially the same fashion. BRANDT, supra note 3, at 41–42 (“Dissolving the monopoly merely put
an oligopoly in its place.”).
23
This transformation occurred as a result of several agents acting in concert. In the early years
of the twentieth century, American society was in the clutches of a temperance movement that equated
tobacco with alcohol. Id. at 45–46. As a result, antismoking organizations pressed for protections for
minors, restrictions on smoking in public places, and bans on women smoking. One publication
reported an alleged study that demonstrated an association between juvenile smoking and juvenile
delinquency. Id. at 47 (quoting HENRY FORD, THE CASE AGAINST THE LITTLE WHITE SLAVER:
VOLUME I, II, III & IV 29 (1916)). An early movement proclaiming the rights of nonsmokers sought
restrictions on smoking in restaurants and other public places. Id. at 49. In 1908, an ordinance was
passed that prohibited women from smoking in public. Id. at 57. Brandt states: “Cigarette smoking
among young women was often viewed by critics as the first step down a slippery path of moral decline
that led to drinking, petting, and ‘other’ sexual behavior.” Id. at 58.
24
Id. at 57.
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from experiencing full equality.
Its appeal was that it represented
“virtually all things to all people.”26
The third social factor Brandt examines was the industry’s
development of a sophisticated marketing and public relations machine.
The industry did not hesitate to take full advantage of the shifting cultural
landscape to build its product into the preeminent leisure consumer
product.27 It did so, according to Brandt, through a campaign of
advertising and promotion designed to lead the consuming public to
believe that it had chosen to smoke without undue commercial influence.
Brandt’s position is that the tobacco industry manipulated public attitudes
and knowledge in such a way as to deprive the consuming public of
important facts regarding the health hazards of its products and to associate
cigarette smoking with desirable cultural images, such as modernity,
acceptance, and attractiveness.28
The conjunction of these three social factors allowed the industry to
embrace and promote the concept of free choice, or “consent,” to
manipulate the consuming public; this concept would have important
implications for both regulation and tort litigation. The public was lured
into believing that it had voluntarily chosen to smoke and had not been
induced by advertising or, as later scientific studies demonstrated, become
addicted. This “engineering of consent”29 was to remain a key component
of the industry’s strategy for the promotion of cigarettes through most of
the twentieth century.
The notion that smoking was a choice freely made by consumers went
a long way toward explaining regulators’ hands-off approach to tobacco

25
Brandt observes that the antismoking movement early in the twentieth century “paradoxically
made [the cigarette] a powerful symbol of modernity and burnished its appeal.” Id. at 67.
26
Id. at 100.
27
“The triumph of the cigarette did not occur by serendipity. Even as smoking seemed to fit with
a modern consumer age, the very development of consumption was carefully and artfully constructed
by powerful corporations with extensive resources.” Id. at 67.
28
The industry’s aggressive advertising campaigns took full advantage of the emerging field of
psychology in shaping public opinion. See id. at 77–78 (“The public must be given ideas as to what it
should like . . . . The old sales bywords ‘know your customer’s needs’ have been remolded to ‘know
what your customer should need and then educate him on those needs.’”). One pervasive advertising
technique was to encourage consumers, particularly women, to smoke instead of snacking, so as to
maintain a “slender figure.” Id. at 72 (citing ROBERT SOBEL, THEY SATISFY: THE CIGARETTE IN
AMERICAN LIFE 101 (1978)). Brandt describes a 1928 ad for American Tobacco’s Lucky Strike
brand—part of a broader ad campaign in the same vein—that showed the famed aviator Amelia Earhart
and included the statement, “‘For a Slender Figure—Reach for a Lucky Instead of a Sweet.’” Id.
(citing ROBERT SOBEL, THEY SATISFY: THE CIGARETTE IN AMERICAN LIFE 101 (1978)). Not only did
the ad invoke the fashionable figure of the day, but it also made use of a celebrity testimonial to
promote the product.
29
The source of this phrase was Edward Bernays, Sigmund Freud’s nephew, who came to the
United States and emerged as one of the first public relations experts. Id. at 80–81. Bernays took a
position with American Tobacco in the late 1920s and launched the campaign that he called
“engineering of consent.” Id. at 81, 87–88.
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products.
American public opinion has remained equally hands-off,
endorsing the right of adults to choose whether or not to smoke.31
Moreover, the tobacco industry came to rely upon assumption of the risk as
a standard defense—and a largely successful one—in personal injury
lawsuits brought by smokers.32 Philip Morris USA has incorporated a
version of assumption of the risk into its public position on smoking and
health, currently set forth on its web site, which encourages smokers to
make their own choices:
There is no safe cigarette. Philip Morris USA agrees
with the overwhelming medical and scientific consensus that
cigarette smoking causes lung cancer, heart disease,
emphysema and other serious diseases in smokers. Smokers
are far more likely to develop serious diseases than
non-smokers.
These have been, and continue to be, the messages of the
U.S. Surgeon General and public health authorities
worldwide. Smokers and potential smokers should rely on
these messages when deciding whether or not to smoke.33
The issues of consent and assumption of the risk reflect the complex
responses of the public to perceived risks, responses related to numerous
factors, not merely mathematical risks.34
Brandt’s discussion of the social factors related to smoking during the
twentieth century supports his position that the tobacco industry operated
out of self-interest and disregard for the health of the entire population,
both consumers of cigarettes and nonsmokers exposed to their smoke. Few
would dispute this assessment in a long-term sense, although other
commentators have examined the industry through a more neutral lens.35
30

See infra Part II.C.
Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the United
States, in REGULATING TOBACCO 11, 35 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (“There
is no sign that most Americans wish to prohibit the manufacture and sale of tobacco products, except
for sales to juveniles . . . .”).
32
See, e.g., Glenn Collins, Cigarette Makers Win Verdict in Suit by a Smoker’s Family, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 1996, at A8, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (explaining that an Indiana
jury placed blame for injuries on the plaintiff because he made a choice to smoke with full knowledge
of the hazards); Milo Geyelin, RJR’s Tobacco Unit Wins a Big Victory: Jury Clears It of Blame in
Smoker’s Death—Wall Street Had Scrutinized Florida Trial as Signal On Future Litigation, WALL ST.
J., May 6, 1997, at A3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (describing a Florida jury’s
placing of blame for injuries on the plaintiff, who had begun smoking at age 15).
33
Philip Morris USA, http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Products/Cigarettes/Health_
Issues/Cigarette_Smoking_and_Disease/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
34
See John Slade, Marketing Policies, in REGULATING TOBACCO 72, 74–75 (Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001) (discussing studies on the public’s perception of risk).
35
For example, in Ashes to Ashes, Kluger focused to a large extent on the entrepreneurial nature
of the early tobacco executives and their efforts in developing a large multinational industry. See
KLUGER, supra note 6 (describing those individuals responsible for the development of the tobacco
31
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Still, Brandt’s public-health oriented approach is well-served by his
argument that these social factors created a perfect storm for the tensions
among science, governmental regulators, and the judicial system.
B. The Rise of the “New Epidemiology”
The major focus and most important aspect of The Cigarette Century is
Brandt’s examination of the historical development of public health
measures to identify and evaluate health risks—such as those posed by
smoking and by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)—that arose slowly
over time. Brandt repeatedly demonstrates the ways in which smokingrelated illness is significantly different from the infectious and
communicable illnesses that preoccupied the public health community
throughout most of the twentieth century.36 Those latter illnesses, such as
influenza, were borne by biological organisms and typically characterized
by acute symptoms arising soon after exposure.37 In contrast, smokingrelated illness and other illnesses resulting from toxic exposures typically
manifest in symptoms only after a latency period of months, years, or even
decades from the time of initial exposure, and often well after exposure has
ceased.38
In the mid-twentieth century, as detailed by Brandt, researchers turned
their attention to the causes of chronic illness in the population.39 A 1938
study derived from family data suggested a statistical relationship between
smoking and a reduction in life span, with greater reduction occurring in
persons who smoked more.40 But ascertaining whether a causal connection
existed between smoking and certain illnesses was a much more difficult
endeavor. Thus, the public health community sought a new investigatory
strategy that culminated in what Brandt refers to as the “new
epidemiology.”41 In the strongest section of The Cigarette Century, Brandt
explains the shift in epidemiological inquiry away from acute organismindustry); cf. Kagan & Nelson, supra note 31, at 15 (“Many of the distinctive features of American
tobacco policy not only appear to be roughly in line with American public opinion . . . but also in tune
with enduring characteristics of American political culture.”).
36
See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 3, at 122 (“[I]t took a dramatic epidemiologic transition—the
decline of infectious disease as a dominant cause of mortality—to make the harms of cigarette smoking
fully explicit.”).
37
In the 1940s, “[a]ccording to many investigators, proving causation now required the
identification of a ‘specific’ mechanism under laboratory conditions” to reveal the disease-causing
organisms. Id. at 119.
38
For example, latency periods for manifestation of asbestos-related illness typically run
anywhere from ten to thirty years. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1084–85
(5th Cir. 1973) (discussing the findings reported in Selikoff, Churg, & Hammond, The Occurrence of
Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulation Workers, 132 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 139, 146–47 (1965)).
39
Brandt observes that “[t]he shift in patterns of disease and the increase in life expectancies
made new risks possible—and ultimately visible.” BRANDT, supra note 3, at 122.
40
Id. at 126–27 (citing Raymond Pearl, Tobacco Smoking and Longevity, 87 SCI. 216 (1938)).
41
Id. at 123.
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induced illness to chronic illnesses with potentially multiple causes. Thus,
Brandt states:
Identifying the health risks of a particular behavior like
smoking fit [the old] model poorly. The length of time
before the disease developed was protracted . . . [and] the
large number of intervening variables confounded the
emerging notion of specific causality. Everyone “exposed”
did not get the disease, and most did not . . . .42
This new epidemiology took advantage of statistical comparisons between
people who had cancer and a control group of those who did not,
attempting to determine what factors may have been responsible for the
development of cancer.43 The new studies attempted to account for the
latency period and the possibility of intervening and confounding
variables. The results of the studies provided concrete evidence of the
relationship between smoking cigarettes and various illnesses. Still, such
data did not provide the level of causal proof in individual cases that the
law generally requires.44
Brandt documents the tobacco industry’s strong reaction to the studies,
which included a public relations strategy for creating scientific
controversy.45 This was no small feat: By 1950 the news media published
an increasing stream of articles reporting studies that showed a relationship
between smoking and lung cancer. Working collectively, in 1953 the
cigarette manufacturers began to put into place their public relations plan,
which operated on several fronts. The key approach was to bring into their
fold scientists skeptical of the studies showing a cigarette-cancer
connection and using them to focus public attention on what the industry
characterized as “controversy.”46 This approach blossomed into the
establishment of official-sounding “bureaus” and “committees,” all of

42

Id. at 120.
Id. at 123.
For a discussion of the relationship between the new epidemiology and current toxic tort
litigation, see infra, Part III. See also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic
Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths of the Tort and Workers’ Compensation Systems, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 888–89 (1992) (discussing the same issues in the context of reproductive and
genetic injuries). Brandt notes that correlations between smoking and various negative outcomes that
were observed in the clinical setting in the early part of the twentieth century eventually were validated
through other, more acceptable studies. Of the early clinical observations, he states:
These clinical observations of the impact of smoking are, in retrospect, quite
impressive. Almost all the risks that would later come to be attributed to smoking
had been well documented by clinicians in the first decades of the century. Even the
risks of passive exposure to cigarette smoke had been well articulated.
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 128 (footnote omitted).
45
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 160.
46
Id. at 167.
43
44

572

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:561
47

which were nothing more than industry mouthpieces. The industry also
launched an aggressive new advertising strategy focused on the alleged
benefits of filter cigarettes.48
Brandt’s discussion of the creation of the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee (TIRC) provides the reader with insight into the science
strategy of the industry at mid-century. He shows that the industry’s
professed interest in demonstrating scientific controversy was less about
science than about obfuscation of scientific data,49 and that the industry’s
purpose in establishing the TIRC was to support the industry’s existing
position of scientific controversy. While the TIRC purported to conduct
independent—and presumably neutral—scientific research,50 Brandt
47

For example, in 1953, R.J. Reynolds created the “Bureau of Scientific Information” to
challenge the scientific studies showing a connection between smoking and cancer. Id. The industry
collectively established the Tobacco Industry Research Committee (TIRC) and publicly announced that
the TIRC would conduct research into the health effects of smoking, presumably to give the public
reason to believe that the industry was committed to providing a safe product. See id. at 170–71
(providing a background of the establishment of the TIRC).
48
The cigarette manufacturers retreated from their earlier advertising campaigns touting the
quasi-health benefits of their particular brands, some of which had made use of physicians. During the
1930s, the manufacturers had made varied claims about the positive aspects of cigarettes. See KLUGER,
supra note 6, at 77 (describing American Tobacco’s promotion of Lucky Strikes as appetite
suppressants: “Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet”); id. at 86 (describing R.J. Reynolds’s promotion
of Camels using the image of a pilot to suggest cigarettes’ tranquilizing effect: “It Takes Steady Nerves
to Fly the Mail at Night. . . . That’s why I smoke Camels. And I smoke plenty! Camels never ruffle or
jangle my nerves, and I like their mild, rich flavor.”); id. at 87 (discussing R.J. Reynolds’s promotion
of Camels’ stimulating or energizing effect: “You Get a Lift With a Camel;” “A Harmless Restoration
of the Flow of Natural Body Energy”); id. at 88 (describing R.J. Reynolds’s promotion of Camels as a
means of improving digestion: “For Digestion’s sake, smoke Camels!”); id. at 117 (referring to
American Tobacco’s promotion of Pall Malls as a method of reducing throat scratch: “gentles the
smoke”); see also BRANDT, supra note 3, at 93 (mentioning that Lorillard also promoted Old Golds as
gentle on one’s throat: “Not a Cough in a Carload”). But in the 1950s, in apparent reaction to the
health studies, the industry took a different tack by touting the health protections of filters, such as
Lorillard’s “Micronite” filter used in the Kent brand. See KLUGER, supra note 6, at 151 (describing
how Lorillard promoted Kents as “The Greatest Health Protection in Cigarette History”); id. at 155
(noting Liggett & Myers’s use of the actor Fredric March to promote its filter-tip L&M brand, saying
“L&M Filters Are Just What the Doctor Ordered!”). Brandt states that this host of health claims
demonstrated that the industry sought to make its product something “that could be virtually all things
to all people.” BRANDT, supra note 3, at 100. It turned out that the Kent Micronite filter contained a
form of asbestos, so whether or not the filter reduced the amount of nicotine and tar that reached the
smoker, it created a different health hazard. See Quickel v. Lorillard, Inc., No. 95-5255, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23453, at *4–*6, *24–*26 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 1999) (holding admissible expert evidence of
causation in a case claiming that asbestos in Micronite filter cigarettes caused decedent’s mesothelioma
death).
49
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 173. Among other facts, the first executive director of the TIRC had
no scientific background, and the first full-time chair of the organization was a long-time veteran of
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company. Id.
50
A press release naming Timothy V. Hartnett, the former president of Brown & Williamson, as
the first chair stated that the purpose of the TIRC was “to sponsor research into all phases of tobacco
use and health.” Press Release, Tobacco Industry Research Committee (July 1, 1954), available at
http://tobaccodocuments.org/ctr/11310600-0601.html. Hartnett himself stated: “The tobacco industry
is determined to find the answers to the public's questions about smoking and health. The appointment
of a full-time chairman completes an organization dedicated to carrying on comprehensive and
objective scientific and statistical research to establish the facts and report them to the public.” Id.
Furthermore, the press release outlined the following as the position of the TIRC:
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presents ample support for his assertions that the TIRC was created to
support and promote the industry’s position that smoking cigarettes was no
more harmful than any other aspect of life. Already predisposed to
rejecting the increasing scientific knowledge of the connection between
smoking and cancer,51 the TIRC and the industry adhered to this position
for decades in the face of mounting evidence of causation.52
Indeed, Brandt asserts that the TIRC did not really study the effects of
smoking and health in the 1950s at all.53 Rather, the TIRC’s strategy was
to learn of ongoing studies elsewhere and develop a plan for public rebuttal
the instant that results were released—and sometimes even before they
were released.54 The TIRC was not just focused on using the media; it
used the medical profession as well. Beginning in 1958, the TIRC
disseminated a periodical entitled “Tobacco and Health” free of charge to
the medical and dental professions, with the theme that insufficient
scientific evidence existed to demonstrate a connection between smoking
and lung cancer.55
Another pivotal public health development detailed by Brandt is the
It is an obligation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee at this time to
remind the public of these essential points:
1. There is no conclusive scientific proof of a link between smoking and cancer.
2. Medical research points to many possible causes of cancer. Statistics
indicating a relationship between smoking and disease could apply with equal force
to many other aspects of modern life.
...
5. The millions of people who derive pleasure and satisfaction from smoking can
be reassured that every scientific means will be used to get all the facts as soon as
possible.
Id.

51
See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 175–83 for a discussion of the appointment of Clarence Cook
Little, a geneticist and eugenicist who elevated laboratory research over other scientific investigation,
as the first scientific director of the TIRC. Little was a self-proclaimed skeptic about causal
relationships between exposures and illnesses and had focused his own research on heredity and cancer.
Id. at 175–76, 179.
52
This mounting evidence included an extensive study in 1957 of autopsies of deceased smokers.
Id. at 187 (citing, among other sources, Oscar Auerbach et al., Changes in the Bronchial Epithelium in
Relation to Smoking and Cancer of the Lung: A Report of Progress, 256 N. ENG. J. MED. 104 (1957)).
The research program put into place by TIRC scientific director Clarence Cook Little was one, in
Brandt’s view, that not only was anti-epidemiology, but was designed to prevent resolution of the
precise questions the TIRC allegedly was established to answer. “Little and his . . . colleagues
constructed a basic science research program into aspects of carcinogenesis that had little or no
potential to resolve the question that the TIRC had promised the American public would be at the
center of attention: do cigarettes cause disease?” Id. at 182. Ironically, the TIRC at the same time
criticized the studies that did show a causal connection as lacking the experimental scientific rigor that
the TIRC itself did not embrace. In fact, the research that the industry did conduct seemed to confirm
the very studies that the industry was attempting to refute. Id. at 199 (referencing industry studies of
carcinogenic constituents of tobacco smoke); KLUGER, supra note 6, at 362–63 (discussing industryfunded animal studies showing precancerous lesions, which resulted in the researcher being dropped
from the program).
53
See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 186–87 (discussing TIRC’s strategy of avoiding conducting
empirical studies).
54
Id. at 195.
55
Id. at 196–97.
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emergence of scientific evidence demonstrating the relationship of
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) to disease in nonsmokers. Several
factors were significant in bringing public attention to ETS. One was the
role of grassroots public health advocacy groups in raising media
awareness of ETS in the 1970s and 1980s.56 Although researchers had
difficulty measuring exposure to ETS, many of the studies conducted on
nonsmoking spouses of smokers found elevated rates of lung cancer and
cardiovascular disease in these subjects.57 The grassroots organizations
also focused their efforts on urging smoking bans in the states.58 The
industry’s response to the ETS studies mirrored its earlier response to
studies on smoking—attacks on the scientific studies59 and diversions to
other environmental pollutants as possible causes of illness.60
In Brandt’s assessment, by the 1980s, epidemiology had become an
accepted and important tool in the public health arsenal to determine the
causal connection between cigarette smoke and disease. He observes:
First, it was no longer possible, as it had been in the 1950s, to
denigrate epidemiology and statistics. These elements of
medical science had grown to be trusted influences on both
public opinion and policy making. Second, the industry’s
own loss of credibility . . . made the media and the public
unwilling to accept industry attacks as scientifically
legitimate. . . . Finally, American society had become far
more health-conscious since the 1960s—and more risk
averse.61
For example, when smoking on aircrafts became a regulatory battleground
in the ETS movement, the industry was on the losing end, culminating in
the prohibition of smoking on all domestic flights in 1990.62
As a historian, one of Brandt’s major purposes in writing The
Cigarette Century was to conduct an “examination of those particular
social processes by which a culture constitutes and assesses the risks of
life—and death.”63 His ultimate goal is clear—to avert a potential global
health catastrophe in smoking-related illness by illuminating the forces that
have allowed the cigarette to remain a powerful consumer product despite
its health hazards. This is a most ambitious goal, and his narrative
sometimes reads more like a piece of advocacy than a social science
56

Id. at 288.
See id. at 284–85 (detailing the procedures and results of several ETS studies in different
countries).
58
Id. at 289.
59
Id. at 292.
60
Id. at 293.
61
Id. at 295.
62
Id. at 305.
63
Id. at 13.
57
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treatise. But the greatest value of The Cigarette Century lies in Brandt’s
examination of the factors and events in the public health community that
led to the health crisis he documents. Thus, as a historian of science,
Brandt is most interested in the role tobacco played in revolutionizing
epidemiological study to address a new set of public health problems—
those involving exposures to toxic substances and latent illness.64 One area
that would have completed his medical and epidemiological analysis
would have been a discussion of studies on harm reduction in smokers and
the respective effectiveness of methods such as nicotine reduction in
cigarettes, smoking cessation, and nicotine substitutes. It is likely,
however, that that particular chapter in the history of the cigarette has yet
to be clearly written in the scientific literature.65
C. The Rough Road to Regulation
Brandt also examines the role of public health officials in pursuing
regulation of the tobacco industry. He tracks this topic from the early
1960s, through the actions of the country’s chief public health official, the
Surgeon General, and the industry’s efforts to thwart regulation. Once
again, Brandt presents these events as pivotal in the history of public health
in the United States. The first significant development was the committee
established by Luther Terry, President Kennedy’s Surgeon General, for the
purpose of determining the “nature and magnitude of the health effects of
smoking”66 and, ultimately, providing recommendations for action.67 The
report that the committee issued found that smoking caused significant
illness in the United States.68
The release of the Surgeon General’s report in January 1964
constituted a watershed event in the move toward health-based tobacco
regulation. Brandt emphasizes that the Surgeon General’s report was
instrumental in ushering in a salutary new stage in the history of public

64
See infra notes 151–96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between
Brandt’s narrative and the subsequent course of toxic tort law.
65
For a public policy orientated survey of smoking cessation methods and issues, see Kenneth E.
Warner, Reducing Harm to Smokers: Methods, Their Effectiveness, and the Role of Policy, in
REGULATING TOBACCO 111 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
66
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 221 (quoting Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee on Smoking
and Health, THE NATURE, PURPOSE, AND SUGGESTED FORMULATION OF THE STUDY OF THE HEALTH
EFFECTS OF SMOKING, PHASE I (1962)).
67
Id.
68
Brandt states: “For the seventy million regular smokers in the United States, the report of the
committee’s findings confirmed their worst fears. It told them that the death rate from lung cancer was
1,000 percent higher among men who smoked cigarettes than among nonsmokers.” Id. at 224. The
report also concluded that smokers were at a significantly higher risk than nonsmokers of nonmalignant lung conditions. Id.; see also id. at 229 (“At the press conference announcing the
committee’s findings, Terry was asked whether he would now advise a patient to stop smoking. His
answer was an unequivocal ‘yes.’” (citation omitted)).
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health. But transforming the committee’s conclusions into government
action proved problematic, largely as a result of the tobacco industry’s
continued portrayal of the science as controversial.70 Brandt details the
difficult, tortuous road toward regulating an industry with substantial
political support and an unyielding commitment to creating the illusion of
scientific controversy. One fact that demonstrates the tenacity of the
industry and its product is that the aftermath of the release of the report did
not see any significant immediate decline in smoking in the United
States.71 More problematic, perhaps, was the fact that the Office of the
Surgeon General did not have the immediate ability to launch the antismoking initiatives that the report seemed to mandate.72 The report proved
pivotal, nevertheless, as the Office of the Surgeon General thenceforth
assumed an active role in public health matters.73
Regulation of tobacco products proved elusive from the very start.
Although the tobacco industry had come under the scrutiny of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) as early as the 1930s because of its advertising
campaigns promoting the alleged health benefits of smoking,74 the industry
remained—and continues to this day to remain—virtually unregulated.75 It
was not until 1965 that Congress mandated a health warning on cigarette
packaging. The resulting legislation required the placement of a warning
on packages of cigarettes stating, “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous to Your Health.”76 According to Brandt, the tobacco industry’s
supporters engineered the legislation to protect the manufacturers from tort
judgments and to assist them in advancing their primary defense to tort
69
In the future, “[r]esolving controversies in science, medicine, and public health . . . would
increasingly require the integration of scientific data from a wide range of experiments, studies, and
clinical observations.” Id. at 238. The new protocol arising from the process developed by the
Surgeon General’s Advisory Committee in producing its report consisted primarily of (1) eliminating
conflicts of interest among the investigators and evaluators; (2) achieving consensus among
participants with diverse scientific proclivities; and (3) providing a means to resolve conflicts among
the group. Id. A key to this process was conducting a comprehensive review of the existing
experimental data, epidemiological studies, and clinical observations. Id. With regard to the
relationship between smoking and adverse health effects, there was a remarkable consistency among
the results of the studies employing different scientific methodologies. Id. at 228.
70
Id. at 231.
71
Although cigarette sales dropped in early 1964, they immediately rebounded, breaking records
for sales, cigarette use, and industry profits. Id. at 237. Smoking levels remained strong through 1973.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 239. “The 1964 report remains a signal contribution not only to the history of the
cigarette but to the history of public health.” Id.
74
Id. at 243; see also KLUGER, supra note 6, at 189 (describing the 1958 attempt to regulate tar
and nicotine in cigarettes under the auspices of the FTC).
75
See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 273 (noting that cigarettes were expressly excluded from
regulation under the Fair Labeling and Packaging Act of 1966, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970,
and the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972).
76
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282–
83 (1965).
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actions—assumption of the risk. Subsequent legislation in 1969 changed
the warning to state that cigarette smoking “[i]s [d]angerous.”78 In 1984,
the labels were modified again to the multiple, rotating warnings currently
in use.79 By any standard, this so-called regulation was minimal at best.
The major test of the tobacco industry’s strategy on regulation
occurred in 1992. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court ruled on whether the plaintiff’s product liability claims
were preempted by the 1965 and 1969 labeling acts.80 In a plurality
opinion, the Court held that the failure-to-warn claims were expressly
preempted,81 but that claims for misrepresentation, express warranty, and
negligent research and testing would be allowed to go forward.82 The
decision thwarted the industry’s strategy to use regulation as a shield for all
tort actions. Instead, Cipollone allowed the courts—and common-law tort
actions in particular—to serve as a vehicle for redress for people claiming
to be harmed by the health risks of smoking. Brandt states: “The industry
had long feared the emergence of such aggressively contested
litigation . . . . In the courts, antitobacco advocates certainly had not found
a level playing field; nonetheless they had found a field.”83 The other side
of this transition to tort law was the tobacco industry’s insistence that the
judicial system was wrongly allowed to legislate in an area where
Congress had declined to do so.84 The industry’s position was one aspect
of a growing tort reform movement committed to limiting or eliminating
tort litigation.85
Brandt argues that Cipollone signaled a “critical transition” in the war
against the tobacco industry.86 Previously, the industry had adamantly
denied—at least publicly—the health risks of smoking, acceding only that
there might be a controversy over the relationship between smoking and
disease. The industry’s new position was an admission that smoking was a
“risk factor” in the development of lung cancer, but that no proof existed
77

BRANDT, supra note 3, at 254, 257.
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 4, 84 Stat. 87–88 (1970).
79
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, §§ 4(a)(1)–(b)(1), 98 Stat. 2200–
02 (1984).
80
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of
the impact of the Cipollone decision on subsequent product preemption jurisprudence, see infra Part
IV.
81
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524. For a discussion of express preemption in this context, see Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen, Sense or Sensibility?: Toxic Product Liability Under State Law After Cipollone
and Medtronic, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 4–11 (1996).
82
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524–29.
83
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 353.
84
Id.
85
See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 648, 105th Cong., tit. III, § 2(a)(4) (1997)
(referring to the tort system in “Findings” as resulting in “excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary
damage awards and unfair allocation of liability”).
86
Brandt expansively calls it “a critical transition in both the legal and social history of the
cigarette in American life.” BRANDT, supra note 3, at 352.
78
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that smoking actually caused lung cancer.
This shift in the industry’s position opened the door for another federal
effort at regulation, this time by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).88 Brandt chronicles the efforts of the FDA to regulate tobacco
products, culminating in the United States Supreme Court’s 2000 decision,
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., which struck down
provisions regulating cigarettes as nicotine delivery devices.89 Brandt
identifies several circumstances that created a climate conducive to FDA
regulatory efforts. First, he notes that the industry’s long-standing strategy
of creating controversy, criticizing statistical science, and denying the
harms of cigarettes was no longer persuasive. Both the media and the FDA
focused on the tobacco industry’s own research—mostly on so-called
“safer cigarettes”—which confirmed the addictive qualities of nicotine.90
When the top executives of the major tobacco companies appeared before a
Congressional committee, their denials of the addictive nature of nicotine
rang hollow to a public that had been educated by the media about the
results of the scientific studies.91
Second, Brandt credits the release of thousands of previously
confidential tobacco industry documents with significantly changing the
regulatory climate.92 When certain industry documents came into the
possession of Stanton Glantz at the University of California at San
Francisco, he made them public, revealing the cognitive dissonance
between the industry’s position over the years and its internal knowledge
87

Id. at 341.
For a detailed insider’s description of the FDA’s efforts, see DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF
INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY (2001) (describing in minute detail
his participation in the FDA’s efforts to regulate the tobacco industry during the 1990s). See also
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 579 (referring to former FDA Commissioner Kessler as his major source on
the FDA’s efforts to regulate the tobacco industry).
89
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). The trigger for FDA
regulation of cigarettes is whether the product was “intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2000). The difficulty with cigarettes was that they are
combination products, both a device and a drug (nicotine), which are regulated separately in the FDCA.
The FDA viewed the cigarette as a drug delivery device for nicotine. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at
127. In the mid-1990s, the FDA Commissioner, David Kessler, became concerned over the evidence
that nicotine levels in cigarettes were rising after an earlier period of decline. See KESSLER, supra note
88, at 161–64 (discussing the investigation into the manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes and
providing a very personal and detailed account of his efforts to regulate cigarettes).
90
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 365.
91
Id. at 366–67.
92
Initially, whistleblowers who were former employees of the tobacco industry came forward
with testimony and documentary evidence detailing the industry’s decades-long knowledge of the
hazards of cigarettes. Id. at 369–70 (discussing Merrell Williams, a former paralegal for Brown &
Williamson’s law firm, who stole and released more than 4000 pages of documents); id. at 375–84
(discussing Jeffrey Wigand, a former research scientist for Brown & Williamson, who provided the
media with information regarding manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes). See generally
MICHAEL OREY, ASSUMING THE RISK: THE MAVERICKS, THE LAWYERS, AND THE WHISTLE-BLOWERS
WHO BEAT BIG TOBACCO (1999) (using interviews and trial records to tell the story of the exposure of
tobacco industry practices).
88
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and practices.
Indeed, the availability of the industry documents
dramatically changed the entire debate over the hazards of both smoking
and ETS, reaching into courtrooms around the country as well as the halls
of Congress.
In seeking to regulate tobacco products, the FDA took the position that
it had the discretion to determine whether to regulate cigarettes as either
medical devices or drugs, based on the theory that they were nicotine
delivery devices.94 The resulting device rules were child-centered,
involving sales and advertising.95 The industry challenged the proposed
rules, arguing that the FDA had no jurisdiction to promulgate them.
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the industry,96
holding that Congress had never intended to grant authority to the FDA to
regulate tobacco products.97
Brandt’s discussion of regulation ends pessimistically, but he may
have given up on this possibility too soon. In 2008, the prospect of FDA
regulation of cigarettes looms much larger, this time with the support of
Philip Morris USA which originally came out in favor of FDA regulation
in 2003,98 presumably with a renewed eye toward preemption of commonlaw tort actions. In July 2008, the House of Representatives, by an
overwhelming majority, passed a bill that would regulate, though not
93

BRANDT, supra note 3, at 371–72. See generally STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE
PAPERS 30–32 (1996) (describing tobacco industry documents and including edited versions of some of
the documents). A vast collection of tobacco industry documents is stored in the Legacy Tobacco
Documents Library at the University of California at San Francisco. Legacy Tobacco Documents
Library, http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
94
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 129; see FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) (2000) (“The Secretary
may by regulation require that a device be restricted to sale, distribution, or use . . . upon such other
conditions as [the FDA] may prescribe in such regulation, if, because of its potentiality for harmful
effect . . . [the FDA] determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and
effectiveness.”).
95
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126.
96
Id. at 133. The FDA had documented in detail the health risks associated with cigarettes. The
Court said that if the regulations for devices were intended to apply to tobacco products, the
documented hazards would have required the FDA to ban cigarettes from the market. Id. at 135, 137.
Congress had effectively prohibited this when it enacted a provision that stated: “The marketing of
tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United States with ramifying activities
which directly affect interstate and foreign commerce at every point, and stable conditions therein are
necessary to the general welfare.” 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). Thus, an absolute ban would “plainly
contradict congressional policy.” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 139. The Court held that the
FDA’s attempt to circumvent this problem was an improper application of the regulations. Id. at 140.
97
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126. The Court examined the 1938 FDCA and found nothing
in the act or in the legislative history to suggest that Congress granted the FDA authority over tobacco.
Moreover, the FDA had repeatedly stated over the years that it did not have such authority, and this
worked against its argument before the Court. Id. at 144–46. At least in partial reliance on this
position, Congress has declined to enact any legislation to specifically grant jurisdiction to the FDA.
Id. at 145–46. When Congress did enact tobacco-specific legislation—in particular, the cigarette
labeling acts—it also declined to grant authority to regulate to the FDA, keeping that authority for
itself. Id. at 149.
98
Philip Morris CEO Tells House Panel FDA Should Get Power to Regulate Tobacco, TOXICS
L. REP., June 6, 2003, at 590.
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eliminate, nicotine in cigarettes and ban flavored (but not menthol)
cigarettes.99 The legislation was developed in part through an agreement
with Philip Morris.100 Other cigarette manufacturers are less enthusiastic
than Philip Morris about the prospect of regulation. For example, a
representative of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company expressed concern
about his company having a “competitive disadvantage” in an era of
standardized cigarette ingredients.101 The prospect of FDA regulation has
raised a question in some public health circles as to whether regulation of
cigarettes would create the erroneous and oddly counterintuitive
impression that smoking is safe.102 At the present time, however, Brandt’s
concluding point103 on regulation continues to be true: More than forty
years after the first Surgeon General’s report on smoking, no
comprehensive regulation of cigarettes is in place.
D. The Era of Tobacco Litigation
The disclosure of the industry documents paved the way for the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the tobacco industry and the
states.104 Brandt examines the relationship between the failed FDA
regulations and the efforts of the states to address the health aspects of
smoking using innovative litigation. In 1994, the state of Mississippi filed
the first such suit against the tobacco industry, claiming that the state’s
taxpayers had suffered losses associated with public expenditures, such as
through the Medicaid program, for smoking-related illness.105 Moreover,
the suit included a public nuisance claim seeking forward-looking
injunctive relief to abate the nuisance perpetrated by the industry,
99
Stephanie Saul, House Votes to Rgulate Tobacco as a Drug, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2008, at C2
(correction appended).
100
Id. (stating that the bill was partly the result of negotiations with Philip Morris, but that not all
tobacco companies supported it).
101
See Gardiner Harris, Path to Tobacco Bill Includes Compromise and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES,
July 17, 2007, at A14, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (quoting R.J. Reynolds
representative as stating that the proposed regulation would make it too difficult to “communicate
product differences” to smokers, and reporting that cigarette makers object to the competitive
advantage regulation would give to Philip Morris, in its dominant position in the market); Gregory
Lopes, Senate Bill to Let FDA Regulate Tobacco; Agency Could Limit Ads, Curb Tar and Nicotine,
WASH. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at C8, available at LEXIS, News Library, WTIMES File (quoting a
representative of R.J. Reynolds as stating that “[t]he advertising restrictions in the bill are anticompetitive”).
102
See Harris, supra note 101 (reporting testimony by FDA Commissioner Andrew von
Eschenbach that the FDA should not be put in a position to decide whether cigarettes are safe).
103
See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 396–97 (quoting Republican Congressman J.C. Watts as stating
that “[t]he FDA seems to be interested in doing everything except what they are responsible for”).
104
See infra notes 118–26 and accompanying text.
105
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 414. The federal government filed a major action against the
tobacco industry as well, which was part reimbursement suit and part civil RICO action. See United
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that Philip Morris had
intended to defraud American citizens with respect to its statements regarding the health effects of
smoking).
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particularly toward children. Several other state suits followed.
In 1997, the attorneys general of the litigating states—with the
exception of Minnesota—began negotiating with the tobacco companies to
achieve a “global settlement” that would reach beyond the pending
lawsuits.108 Brandt demonstrates that the industry’s concern for revelations
in their now-public internal documents and compromises the industry had
already made in some personal injury actions placed the industry in a weak
position in the state suits. That the industry would end up coming out
ahead as a result of the ultimate settlement of these suits is an example of
its tenacity, the continued popularity of its product, and the continuing
inability of the public health community and the government to fashion a
consistent approach to the public health threat of smoking.
The 1997 negotiations led to the ill-fated first global settlement
agreement.109 That agreement contained provisions that resembled the
regulations the FDA was attempting to put into place, such as limitations
on advertising and marketing. Primarily, the industry agreed to reimburse
the states for their costs for smoking-related illnesses and programs. The
agreement contained promises to fund and establish public health
programs, as well as to allow the FDA to regulate nicotine if youth
smoking did not decline to certain prescribed levels.110 Its most dramatic
provisions involved limitations on tort litigation. In exchange for the
accessions of the industry, the parties agreed to cap damages in tobacco
lawsuits, prohibit class actions, and ban punitive damages for any past
conduct of the industry.111 The agreement did, however, require Congress
to act for it to go into effect.112 Congressional disagreement, coupled with
a looming trial deadline in the Mississippi suit,113 stymied the legislation,
and it never materialized.
Brandt demonstrates the split in the public health community that
contributed significantly to the failure of the 1997 global settlement
legislation. One segment of the public health community resisted
negotiation and settlement out of a belief that such an approach would
benefit only the industry, not the public.114 In the context of the 1997
agreement, this skepticism manifested itself in a resistance to limiting the
remedial role of the tort system for tobacco-related injuries.115 In contrast,
other segments of the public health community favored the settlement
106

BRANDT, supra note 3, at 414.
Id. at 415.
108
Id. at 420–21.
109
Id. at 422.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 423.
114
Id. at 424.
115
Id. at 425.
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because it represented, at long last, some form of tobacco regulation.116 In
Congress, modifications of the agreement inevitably occurred, and
ultimately the tobacco industry itself opposed the legislation.117
Soon after the announcement of the 1997 global settlement agreement,
Mississippi settled its suit against the industry, out of necessity, in the days
immediately before it was scheduled to go to trial.118 Subsequently,
Florida and Texas settled their suits; Minnesota settled during trial.119
With the failure of the legislation in Congress, the other states that had
filed similar actions negotiated the MSA that went into effect in 1998, but
which bore little resemblance to the 1997 agreement.120 The MSA offered
an opportunity for all states to sign onto the agreement, including those
that had not commenced reimbursement lawsuits against the industry.121
The top tobacco companies agreed to pay a sum of $206 billion over a
period of twenty-five years to reimburse the states for their public
expenditures.122 The companies further agreed to fund anti-smoking
initiatives in the states and acquiesced to some restrictions in
advertising.123 But, as Brandt points out, the provisions had no real teeth.
Moreover, the MSA did not require the monies paid to the states to be used
for anti-smoking campaigns—or even public health initiatives—and were
treated by the states as “a windfall to governors and legislators with little
interest in battling tobacco” for use in unrelated programs.124
Brandt is at his best in illuminating the public health community’s
controversy over these issues, but is less effective in detailing the subtleties
of the legal positions. Others have reported the events leading up to the
MSA in detail,125 but Brandt’s contribution is his ability to place those
116

Id.
Id. at 427–28.
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Id. at 423.
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Id.
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Id. at 432.
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Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), available at http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa.php (last
visited Oct. 10, 2008).
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Id.
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Id.
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BRANDT, supra note 3, at 432. The CDC recommended that a minimum of twenty percent of
each state’s payment be dedicated to an anti-smoking agenda, but Brandt reports that by 2005 only four
percent had been used for those efforts. Id. at 435. Further, because the settlement was to be paid out
over a period of twenty-five years, the states needed the continued health of the tobacco industry. In
Brandt’s words, “the deal had made the states dependent on tobacco revenues . . . [and p]artners with
the tobacco industry.” Id. This situation is exacerbated by the practice of the states selling bond issues
backed by future tobacco settlement payments. Id.
125
See, e.g., MARTHA A. DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN
TOBACCO POLITICS 119–50 (2002) (describing the McCain Bill and congressional inaction leading up
to the MSA); MICHAEL PERTSCHUK, SMOKE IN THEIR EYES: LESSONS IN MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP
FROM THE TOBACCO WARS (2001) (recounting the tobacco industry’s resistance to all serious efforts to
enact regulation in the three decades leading up to the MSA); DAN ZEGART, CIVIL WARRIORS: THE
LEGAL SIEGE ON THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (2000) (describing one lawyer’s tenacious battle against the
tobacco industry).
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events within the context of the history of public health in this country. He
argues that the resulting MSA was expedient for most players. It protected
the tobacco industry from the risks of taking the state cases to trial; it gave
the states the revenues they sought, and the attorneys large fees and the
high profiles they desired. But, he says ruefully, “public health got the
short end.”126
Brandt’s discussion of personal injury litigation in the post-Cipollone
era focuses primarily on the use of the class action device in two important
mass tort cases, one brought by smokers claiming addiction to cigarettes,127
the other by nonsmokers.128 Rather than retread the many legal
developments that led up to and defined these cases, Brandt wisely chooses
to place them in the light of the public health developments they represent.
He also uses them to advance the argument that resorting to the courts was
necessary to bring about some measure of regulation over the tobacco
industry when traditional governmental regulation had failed.
Thus, Brandt views the use of the class action device as a natural
reaction to the public-health challenges of individual lawsuits that had
generally failed for decades. Brandt identifies three factors in particular:
(1) the problems encountered by plaintiffs in proving causation by using
statistical risk science, i.e. epidemiology; (2) the perception of the public,
fueled by the tobacco industry, that smokers bear responsibility for their
own smoking; and (3) the fact that “jurors saw an important inequity in
enriching a few individual smokers or their survivors” at the expense of the
other injured smokers who opted not to sue.129 The class action device had
the advantage of showing broad patterns of disease that were relevant to a
large class of persons—whether the claimants were smokers or
nonsmokers—as well as allowing the plaintiffs to more efficiently use their
limited resources to fight the apparently bottomless financial resources of
the industry.130
Although Brandt does not discuss the class actions in detail, the
impression he leaves is optimism for the use of aggregative litigation, such
as class actions, to bring about some measure of control, if not regulation,
of the tobacco industry. He states: “The courts were . . . a critical venue
not only for injured smokers but for anyone hoping to advance public
health policies regarding smoking.”131 This optimism is not necessarily
warranted. But in the 1990s there was much more reason to be optimistic,
126

BRANDT, supra note 3, at 438.
See Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc, 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (ruling in a class action suit
brought by United States citizens who have suffered from addiction to cigarettes).
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Broin v. Philip Morris Co., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (case settled during
trial).
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with the MSA and several high-profile class actions applying pressure to
the industry simultaneously. The resulting disappointment of the MSA—
that the tobacco industry remains in control, with the states dependent on
the agreement’s revenue stream—is one reason for deflation of that
optimism. Another reason is a trend in judicial rejection of ambitious class
actions that seek to advance a public health regulatory agenda, as discussed
below.132
E. Globalization
The last section of The Cigarette Century focuses on the globalization
of the tobacco industry, what Brandt refers to as “exporting an
epidemic.”133 Beginning in 1975, cigarette use in the United States finally
began to decline, prompting the industry to focus in earnest on other
countries134 where regulation was scarce.135 Brandt argues that it is just a
matter of time before the epidemic of smoking-related illness in the United
States manifests itself as a global pandemic. This coming pandemic will
disproportionately impact developing nations.136
Brandt spends some time detailing the course of cigarette consumption
abroad, which mirrors, to a large extent, the social history of the cigarette
in the United States. Factors such as introducing the cigarette to women
and mining the youth market have contributed to the product’s growth
abroad.137 He further describes the conflict between non-domestic tobacco
companies and state-run cigarette monopolies in some countries. Brandt’s
basic argument is that free trade has led to an increase in smoking-related
illness worldwide, and that this result has been facilitated by a combination
of several factors: the tobacco industry protecting its interests; international
organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank) ignoring the impact free trade would have on world health; United
States trade policy protecting the tobacco industry; and the inability of
procedures pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to sufficiently assess the public health impact of the trade
practices that came within its jurisdiction.138 The result has been that
tobacco products are treated like any other product for trade purposes, a
situation that has created tension between economic interests and public
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See infra Part IV.
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 449.
Id. at 450.
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Id. at 452 (“[T]he tobacco industry maintains strong corporate ties to national governments
that typically have little or no history of product regulation.”).
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Id. at 451.
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Id. at 457.
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See id. at 460–67 (discussing how a number of factors associated with globalization and free
trade led to an increase in smoking-related illnesses worldwide).
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health interests.
Ultimately, Brandt advocates for the development of an international
treaty for tobacco with a strong public health theme. The World Health
Organization (WHO) developed a Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) which is designed to establish minimum standards for a
country’s control of tobacco products. The FCTC endorses, among other
things, package warnings, disclosure that terminology such as “low tar” is
misleading, a ban on advertising, and restrictions on sales to minors.140 In
2003, the member nations of WHO, including the United States, adopted
the FCTC.141 The treaty then went into effect in 2005 and entered a phase
of negotiations with binding protocols.142 While 140 nations had ratified
the FCTC at the time Brandt’s book was published, the United States had
not143 and has yet to do so.144
Brandt’s discussion of the globalization of tobacco and the efforts at
international tobacco control has three basic themes. The first is that, for
political and economic reasons, regulating tobacco on an international
basis is just as difficult, and likely more so, than regulating it in American
society. The second theme returns to the pervasive public health argument
throughout the book. Brandt says that the international public health
community must abandon the notion that contagious diseases should be
managed before chronic non-contagious diseases, such as smoking-related
illness. He argues that because the health benefits of tobacco regulation
will not be visible for years into the future, political officials are less
interested in focusing on a problem that cannot be measured in immediate
benefits.145 Brandt says that the public health effects of tobacco constitute
a global pandemic worthy of action to the same degree as any
communicable disease.146 Third, Brandt argues for an international
concept of public health in which all persons have a “right to a life free of
preventable and treatable disease.”147 He quotes Gro Harlem Brundtland,
the former director-general of WHO: “There is . . . an increasing consensus
for ethical norms, standards, and codes of rules common to all regions and
cultures of the world.”148
The epilogue to the book is clearly an add-on. It is, in part, a
preemptive strike on anyone who would question Brandt’s objectivity and
139
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neutrality in relation to the matters on which he reports. He discusses how
he came to agree to serve as an expert witness for the Department of
Justice in the federal government’s case against the tobacco industry and
details his experience—ultimately disappointing—in the judicial system.149
This concluding section is perhaps unnecessary and somewhat
disconcerting; few attorneys would feel that serving as an expert witness in
major litigation would create a conflict of interest in writing a historical
tale. History is, after all, the product of the historians’ perspectives. But
Brandt is a professional historian, with different sensibilities from an
attorney. While he acknowledges his internal conflict between being a
witness and a historian, he reconciles the conflict by stating that sometimes
the historian must become an advocate.150 Indeed, that summarizes his
dual role as the author of The Cigarette Century.
III. PERSPECTIVES ON CHRONIC ILLNESS AND TOXIC TORTS
A. Scientific Investigation and Chronic Illness at Mid-Century
As previously discussed, the unique value of The Cigarette Century
lies principally in its exposition of the public health history of cigarettes.
Brandt ably demonstrates the industry’s resiliency in the face of increasing
scientific evidence of the health hazards of cigarettes. The uniqueness of
Brandt’s approach lies in his detailed demonstration of the ways in which
the industry was able to take advantage of the developing investigatory
technique of epidemiology151 in the context of chronic illnesses—such as
lung cancer and emphysema—and use it to negate or question the scientific
conclusions that emerged. Even more remarkably, the industry used,
apparently quite successfully, this manufactured controversy affirmatively
in its advertising campaigns for decades.
To understand the impact the new epidemiology has had on toxic tort
149

Id. at 498–503.
Id. at 505.
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Epidemiology may be defined as “[t]he study of the distribution and determinants of healthrelated states in human and other animal populations. Epidemiological studies involve surveillance,
observation, hypothesis-testing, and experiment.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 582 (Marjory
Spraycar et al. eds., 26th ed. 1995). The task of epidemiology is to examine the relationship between a
disease and a particular factor (such as cigarette smoking) to determine if a causal connection exists.
Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV.
732, 750 (1984).
The epidemiologist examines this relationship in the context of populations,
comparing the disease experiences of people exposed to the factor with those not so
exposed. Although the epidemiologist utilizes statistical methods, the ultimate goal
is to draw a biological inference concerning the relationship of the factor to the
disease’s etiology and/or to its natural history. . . . It is an integrative, eclectic
science utilizing concepts and methods from other disciplines, such as statistics,
sociology and demography for the study of disease in populations.
Id. at 750–51.
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litigation, it is useful to follow Brandt’s trail of scientific frustration and
discovery. Brandt begins his analysis early in the twentieth century, with
the public health community’s emerging concern about the possible
relationship between smoking and illness.152 Some of the earliest studies
sought to determine the chemical composition of cigarette smoke and
concluded that smokers were exposed to a variety of substances that were
deemed “poisonous.”153 But the earliest studies that inquired whether a
relationship existed between smoking and illness suffered from the biases
of investigators who based the studies on their pre-existing assumption that
smoking was a health hazard.154 The public health community had not yet
developed a reliable tool to measure statistically the risk of smoking, in
part because of the difficulty in designing studies that took into account the
variable nature of individual exposures, circumstances, and health status.
Accordingly, “[t]hrough the first half of the twentieth century, it proved
impossible to categorically substantiate the claims of the harmfulness of
smoking.”155
The studies generated in the 1940s were designed to eliminate the kind
of bias that had beset the earlier attempts.156 These studies consisted of, on
the one hand, direct medical studies of smokers—such as measuring blood
pressure and heart function—and, on the other hand, animal laboratory
studies.157 The direct medical studies on humans, at best, could only
demonstrate that smoking may aggravate certain cardiovascular conditions,
but they were unable to establish a causal link to smoking.158 The studies
on rats exposed to nicotine demonstrated a negative impact on growth and
development, and on fetal development.159 At least one study on rabbits
demonstrated a connection between exposure to substances in tobacco tars
and tumors.160 While useful, none of these studies was able to provide the
152
This concern was either magnified or clouded, depending upon the observer’s perspective, by
moral concerns. See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 107–08 (“Moral considerations were practically
indistinguishable from concerns about the health effects of cigarette smoking. Did smoking cause
degeneracy? Or was it simply that degenerates liked to smoke? . . . It would take nearly half a century
to disentangle these moral assumptions from medical research on smoking.”). By the 1940s, however,
the relationship between public health issues related to smoking had been separated from the
association with morality. Id. at 116.
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Id. at 107 (quoting R. Kissling, The Chemistry of Tobacco, SCIENTIFIC AM. SUPP., Nov. 25,
1905, at 24999).
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Id. at 111.
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Id. at 116.
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Id. (citing Robert Maris, The Facts About Smoking, HYGEIA, Oct. 1944, at 740–41; Grace M.
Roth et al., The Effect of Smoking Cigarets, 125 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 761 (1944)).
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See id. at 117–18 (citing Floyd De Eds & Robert H. Wilson, Nicotine Toxicity, III. Effect of
Nicotine-Containing Diets on the Estrus Cycle, 59 J. PHARMACOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL
THERAPEUTICS 260–63 (1937); J.M. Essenberg et al., The Effects of Nicotine and Cigarette Smoke on
Pregnant Female Albino Rats and Their Offspring, 25 J. LABORATORY & CLINICAL MED. 708 (1940)).
160
See Id. at 118 (citing A. H. Roffo, Tobacco-Induced Carcinoma in Rabbits, 7 BULL. INST.
EXPERIMENTAL MED. FOR CANCER RES. & TREATMENT 2 (1930); A. H. Roffo & L. B. Smith,
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direct causal connection between smoking and disease in humans that the
public health community sought.
Although epidemiologists had been employing randomized, doubleblind clinical trials to investigate the causes of illness, this type of study
was ill-suited to investigate connections between tobacco and disease.161
With regard to the effects of smoking, these traditional studies posed
several problems. For one thing, the potential long latency period between
exposure and manifestation of illness was a deterrent. Additionally,
exposing study subjects to a substance with potentially harmful effects—
and no therapeutic value—did not comport with appropriate ethical
conduct.162
In 1948, researchers Richard Doll and A. Bradford Hill developed the
retrospective observational study to avoid the disadvantages of the
randomized, double-blind trial.163 The retrospective study began with a
group of ill subjects (in this case, lung cancer patients) and compared them
with healthy subjects. The data collected from both groups were
statistically compared to determine the existence and identity of risk
factors associated with development of the disease.164 The results of the
study demonstrated a strong correlation between cigarette smoking and
lung cancer, as well as a dose-response relationship showing more cases of
lung cancer among those who smoked more.165 The Doll and Hill study,
and resulting report, form the cornerstone for Brandt’s demonstration of a
significant evolution in epidemiology at mid-century. Brandt summarizes
the value of their methodology as follows:
Doll and Hill worked to eliminate the possibility of bias in
the selection of patients and controls, as well as in reporting
and recording their histories; they emphasized the
significance of a clear temporal relationship between
exposure and the subsequent development of disease; and
Tobacco as a Carcinogenic Agent, 63 DEUTSCHE MED. WOCHENSCHRIFT 1267–71 (1937)).
161
Such studies are best suited to, for example, clinical drug trials, where a therapeutic value of
the exposure is anticipated. See Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 151, at 755–56.
162
See BRANDT, supra note 3, at 136.
163
Id.
164
An important feature in the design of such studies was the neutrality of the researchers.
According to Brandt, Doll and Hill appeared to have a sufficiently neutral attitude going into the study,
as they entered the study with “considerable skepticism” about a causal connection between smoking
and lung cancer. Id. at 137.
165
Id. at 138 (citing Raymond Pearl, Tobacco Smoking and Longevity, 87 SCI. 216–17 (1938);
Richard Doll & Austin Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung: Preliminary Report, 224
BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 30, 1950, at 742–43, 747). The study also examined gender distinctions in rates of
lung cancer among smokers. The researchers concluded that the fewer cases among women appeared
to be due to the fact that smoking among women had become commonplace much later than among
men. Id. (citing Richard Doll & Austin Bradford Hill, Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung:
Preliminary Report, 224 BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 30, 1950, at 742–43, 747). This early study demonstrates
the importance of the latency period in identifying the causal connection between a particular exposure
and the appearance of disease.
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they sought to rule out any other factors that might
distinguish controls from patients with disease. This explicit
search for, and elimination of, possible “confounders” was a
critical step toward their conclusion. Further, they insisted
on carefully addressing all possible alternative explanations
for their findings.166
The problem with their approach, however, was that they could not state
definitively that cigarette smoking caused a particular subject’s lung
cancer. They could only provide a statistical probability, or risk factor,
relating to smoking and lung cancer.
Shortly after the publication of their retrospective study,167 Doll and
Hill designed a prospective study that looked at a large group of healthy
physicians whose health and smoking habits they followed for several
years.168 The prospective study, in which no participants were ill with lung
cancer when the study began, eliminated any bias that might have existed
in the earlier study where hospital patients with lung cancer were
specifically studied. The results confirmed the conclusions they had
reached in the retrospective study.169 Moreover, the new epidemiological
studies were consistent with the earlier clinical studies and animal studies.
An impressive body of scientific data was accumulating that tended to
show a causal connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, as
well as cardiovascular disease.170
B. The Science of Toxic Tort Litigation in Historical Context
Brandt’s analysis is consistent with the dilemma of specific causation
in the law of toxic torts. The specific causation problem in toxic torts has
been addressed by many courts, perhaps most pedagogically by the court in
Allen v. United States, a case involving injuries from radiation exposure
during the United States government’s atomic weapons testing program in
the 1950s.171 The plaintiffs suffered from leukemia and other cancers that
they claimed had been induced by exposure to environmental radiation
from the testing program. Several factors complicated their ability to
prove causation, including long latency periods between the time of
exposure and the manifestation of their illnesses, the possibility that other
intervening causes were responsible for the illnesses, and the fact that the
166
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Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 816 F.2d
1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
167
168

590

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:561

illnesses claimed were “non-specific” because radiation-induced cancers
were indistinguishable from cancers resulting from other causes or arising
idiopathically.172
The Allen court succinctly summarized the plaintiffs’ causation
dilemma:
In most cases, the factual connection between
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury is not genuinely in
dispute. Often, the cause-and-effect relationship is obvious:
A’s vehicle strikes B, injuring him; a bottle of A’s product
explodes, injuring B; water impounded on A’s property flows
onto B’s land, causing immediate damage.
In this case, the factual connection singling out the
defendant as the source of the plaintiffs’ injuries and deaths is
very much in genuine dispute. Determination of the causein-fact, or factual connection, issue is complicated by the
nature of the injuries suffered . . . , the nature of the causation
mechanism . . . , the extraordinary time factors and other
variables . . . .173
As the court suggested, in traditional torts, cause in fact is often a relatively
straightforward analysis, a question of drawing an uninterrupted linear
connection between the defendant’s conduct (exploding product, motor
vehicle collision) and the plaintiff’s injury. While challenges always exist
when multiple actors174 or pre-existing conditions175 are involved,
generally a single analysis of cause in fact will suffice. In contrast, cases
involving latent illness, such as toxic torts, typically necessitate a
bifurcation of the cause in fact analysis between determination of general
causation—the ability of the substance to cause the kind of illness suffered
by the plaintiff—and specific causation—proof that the substance actually
caused the occurrence of the illness in the plaintiff.176
Further complicating this inquiry is the fact that medical science has
yet to identify a single mechanism that can definitively be said to cause
172

Id. at 406; see also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 151, at 738 (“Because most toxic tort cases
involve diseases with long latency or incubation periods, and because many of these diseases may
occur in the absence of any identifiable exposure, causation very often becomes a central and complex
issue at trial.”).
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Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 405.
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See, e.g., Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. 1952)
(finding both polluting defendants liable for property damage where each was a substantial factor in
damage).
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See, e.g., Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. 111, 115 (N.H. 1932) (holding
defendant liable only for hastening decedent’s death which was certain to occur from other causes).
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See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988) (requiring plaintiffs
to prove both that the allegedly injurious substances could cause the claimed illnesses and that the
substances actually caused the plaintiffs’ specific illnesses).
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cancer. As a result, in the words of one expert, “any statement about the
role of any agent as a carcinogen is hedged with assumptions and
hypotheses. Because scientists do not yet understand the molecular model
of carcinogenesis, it is impossible to state that a given carcinogen caused
any individual tumor.”177 Even where a particular substance is known to
be carcinogenic, thus establishing general causation, a plaintiff may have
difficulty demonstrating that the exposure to the substance actually caused
his or her individual cancer.178 If cause in fact cannot be established, a
plaintiff will not be able to sustain his or her case for damages, unless a
court is willing to ease the causation requirements.179
Brandt details this medical dilemma which led to the causation
problems that have shaped so much of toxic tort litigation. Brandt admits
that a probabilistic conclusion such as that achieved in the Doll and Hill
study was a major shift in scientific inquiry, and argues that these new
studies were useful for determining the causes of the new kinds of chronic
illnesses emerging in the twentieth century. He states: “For those in search
177
Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in
Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 475 (1988).
178
See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence After Daubert, 55
U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 899 (1994) (noting that a statistical study alone is not enough to prove that a
carcinogenic substance caused a particular individual’s case of cancer). In Sterling v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp., the court stated:
It was first established that Velsicol was responsible for the contamination and that
the particular contaminants were capable of producing injuries of the types allegedly
suffered by the plaintiffs. . . . This enabled the court to determine a kind of generic
causation—whether the combination of the chemical contaminants and the
plaintiffs’ exposure to them had the capacity to cause the harm alleged. This still
left the matter of individual cause to be determined. . . . [G]eneralized proofs will
not suffice to prove individual damages.
Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1200.
179
In Allen v. United States, for example, the court accommodated the plaintiffs by allowing them
to state a case, absent traditional proof of cause in fact, based upon the following test:
Where a defendant who negligently creates a radiological hazard which puts an
identifiable population group at increased risk, and a member of that group at risk
develops a biological condition which is consistent with having been caused by the
hazard to which he has been negligently subjected, such consistency having been
demonstrated by substantial, appropriate, persuasive and connecting factors, a fact
finder may reasonably conclude that the hazard caused the condition absent
persuasive proof to the contrary offered by the defendant.
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 415 (D. Utah 1984). The “connecting factors”
included:
(1) [T]he probability that plaintiff was exposed to ionizing radiation due to nuclear
fallout from atmospheric testing at the Nevada Test Site at rates in excess of natural
background radiation; (2) that plaintiff’s injury is of a type consistent with those
known to be caused by exposure to radiation; and (3) that plaintiff resided in
geographical proximity to the Nevada Test Site for some time between 1951 and
1962. Other factual connections may include but are not limited to such things as
time and extent of exposure to fallout, radiation sensitivity factors such as age or
special sensitivities of the afflicted organ or tissue, retroactive internal or external
dose estimation by current researchers, a latency period consistent with a radiation
etiology, or an observed statistical incidence of the alleged injury greater than the
expected incidence in the same population.
Id.
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of a ‘definitive’ demonstrative experiment, notions of probabilistic,
quantitative findings were anathema. Many researchers now pointed out,
however, that much in medicine and science could not necessarily be
confirmed in the laboratory.”180
In toxic tort litigation, the utility of retrospective and prospective
studies such as those conducted by Doll and Hill is immeasurable. More
than half a century later, however, these studies still carry a legal stigma
associated with their inability to provide a conclusive causal connection
between exposure and disease. Simply put, epidemiological studies are
predictive of the probability that a particular person’s illness may have
resulted from exposure to the particular toxic substance, but do not
establish that the illness actually resulted from the exposure.181 In toxic
tort litigation, epidemiological studies have become the most important
evidence of causation. Thus, in Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., a product liability case involving the drug Bendectin, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that “[u]ndoubtedly, the most useful and
conclusive type of evidence in a case such as this is epidemiological
But plaintiffs have encountered difficult admissibility
studies.”182
problems when using epidemiological evidence because of its probabilistic
nature.183
Brandt acknowledges that at the time the new epidemiology was
emerging, its greatest critics were some of the researchers’ scientific
colleagues who clung to traditional investigative methods. Brandt states:
“Epidemiological findings like those of Doll and Hill would come under
attack from scientists unilaterally committed to experimental laboratory
investigation. But the lab offered no way of resolving the question of
smoking’s harms.”184 Brandt argues that the history of scientific inquiry
into biomedical matters has rejected a single, monolithic investigational
method of the sort these critics favored.185 He further contends that the
tobacco industry was particularly instrumental in keeping alive the notion
of a single-cause modality and in creating a fictional “battle between
laboratory and statistical science” to further its own interests in
maintaining the idea that smoking was safe.186
180
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186
Id. at 153.
181
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The vestiges of this attitude appear in contemporary toxic tort litigation
and continue to present problems for plaintiffs. General Electric Co. v.
Joiner is a case in point.187 Best known as the second in the trio of rulings
by the United States Supreme Court on the admissibility of scientific
evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence,188 Joiner was a toxic tort
suit brought by a worker with lung cancer who claimed workplace
exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), but who also had a history
of smoking and a family history of lung cancer.189 The district court held
that the epidemiological and animal studies proffered by the plaintiff to
prove causation were inadmissible.190 While the Eleventh Circuit
reversed,191 the Supreme Court held that an admissibility decision was
reviewable only for abuse of discretion and that ample evidence existed in
the record to support the decision of the district court.192 The Court was
particularly concerned that the proffered studies did not prove the specific
causation the plaintiff was required to show. The Court stated:
Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of
Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the
expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.193
The Court thus rejected the notion that a study, such as an epidemiological
study, that may demonstrate some measure of general causation could be
made to demonstrate specific causation simply because that was the
position of the plaintiff’s qualified expert.
The Joiner decision raises the legal question connected to the
epidemiological revolution detailed by Brandt in The Cigarette Century:
Can the analytical gap between epidemiological evidence and proof of
specific causation ever be narrowed? This is one of the most pervasive
problems in all of toxic torts. Indeed, some courts have attempted to apply
a statistical standard to the admissibility of epidemiological studies in an
187

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
The best known of the cases is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–96
(1993) (discussing the various factors that should be considered in determining reliability of evidence,
and holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence require that scientific evidence must be both
scientifically reliable and relevant). See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)
(holding that the Daubert admissibility test applies not just to scientific studies, but to any expert
scientific, technical, or other evidence sought to be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
189
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139–40.
190
Joiner v. General Electric Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d 524,
534 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136, 147 (1997).
191
Joiner v. General Electric Co., 78 F.3d 524, 534 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
192
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146–47.
193
Id. at 146.
188
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effort to impose some sort of objective threshold on the admissibility
process. For example, in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., a silicone gel
breast implant case, the federal district court held that only evidence based
upon studies on the relationship between implants and various autoimmune
diseases that had a statistical relative risk factor greater than 2.0 would be
admissible.194 But such efforts remain problematic, largely because
disagreement exists over the significance of statistical relative risk and the
arbitrariness of choosing a particular threshold for admissibility.195
Scientific inquiry is an evolving process, and “arguably there are no
certainties in science.”196 The enterprise of the law, particularly the
judicial system, requires resolution and closure at a definite point in time.
Thus, science and the law may sometimes appear incompatible. In toxic
tort litigation, however, the judicial system must find a point of consensus.
Courts would do well to heed the lessons of the public health community
in fashioning forward-looking rules to accommodate plaintiffs’ causation
difficulties in such cases.
IV. PREEMPTION AND THE INTERACTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
Brandt’s discussion of the attempts at regulating the tobacco industry
resonates throughout other areas of toxic tort law as well. His observations
on regulatory efforts in the area of tobacco products illuminate the current
legal dilemma in federal preemption as it applies to product liability
generally and toxic products in particular. Preemption is a major
battlefield in toxic torts, playing out in litigation related to cigarettes,197
medical devices,198 prescription drugs,199 and pesticides.200 The current
state, and future shape and scope, of toxic product litigation was, in large
part, determined by regulatory events related to tobacco products in the
middle of the twentieth century.
As Brandt demonstrates, the enactment of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965201 marked the first time the tobacco
194

Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1403–05 (D. Or. 1996).
For a discussion of risk factors in epidemiological studies, see Black & Lilienfeld, supra note
151, at 757–58; Junius C. McElveen & Pamela S. Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of
Causation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 39 (1985); see also Lucinda M.
Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using Their Evidentiary
Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 352–60 (1999) (discussing
breast implant litigation and arguing that trial courts have conflated the standard of evidentiary
admissibility and legal sufficiency of claims).
196
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
197
See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530–31 (1992) (plurality opinion).
198
See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 474, 486–89 (1996).
199
See, e.g., Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118
(2008).
200
See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447–48, 452 (2005).
201
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282
(codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2000)).
195
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industry took a concerted stand on regulation with tort litigation in mind.
While the specter of tort litigation had been a threat to the industry from
the earliest emergence of studies connecting smoking and cancer,
following the Surgeon General’s report in the 1960s tort litigation emerged
in the foreground. Brandt discusses the contingent nature of the industry’s
accession to regulation: The industry was only interested in regulation to
the extent that it would operate to preempt state tort actions based upon
smoking and health, thereby immunizing the industry from tort
liabilities.202 The point Brandt makes, however, is that throughout this
period of minimal labeling and advertising regulation in the 1960s and
1970s, the tobacco industry continued to thrive, with cigarette sales
flourishing and profits rising.203 Thus, the appearance of package warnings
seemed to have failed to produce the desired governmental purpose.204
The efforts of the tobacco industry to achieve preemption of state
common-law tort actions against them based upon smoking and health did
not meet with complete success. As Brandt discusses, an important feature
of the legal landscape in the 1960s was the appearance of strict product
liability, made manifest in Section 402A of 1965’s Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which eschewed negligence in favor of requiring the plaintiff to
show that the product was “in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the ultimate user or consumer.”205 Under the emerging strict
product liability regime,206 the tobacco industry worked to establish a
position that would best shield it from what it feared would be a flood of
tort claims by smokers.
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
federal cigarette labeling acts preempted tort claims against the tobacco
companies in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., a product liability action
brought on behalf of a deceased smoker.207 The Supreme Court’s decision
202

BRANDT, supra note 3, at 254.
See id. at 256–57.
See id. at 257.
205
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
206
Product manufacturers logically perceived the requirements of strict liability as releasing
plaintiffs from the more difficult showings of duty and breach of duty that negligence claims require.
The Second Restatement of Torts was also important in making explicit the abrogation of privity of
contract in the product liability context, which made it easier for injured persons to sue under strict
product liability. See id. § 402A(1)(b) (1965) (providing that a seller of a defective product is liable for
a plaintiff’s physical injury if the seller could expect the product to reach the user).
207
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 512 (1992) (plurality opinion). Brandt spends
substantial time discussing the trial of the Cipollone case, which occurred much earlier, following a
ruling by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186–87
(3d Cir. 1986), that effectively preempted many of the plaintiff’s claims. See BRANDT, supra note 3, at
329–35. The jury found that Liggett had breached its duty to warn of the health hazards of its
cigarettes prior to the 1966 package warnings, but that Rose Cipollone was eighty percent responsible
for her own injuries, which barred any recovery on the negligence claims. Cipollone, 893 F.2d at 554.
The jury awarded $400,000 to her husband, however, for his damages on the claim for breach of
express warranty, but awarded no damages to Rose Cipollone’s estate on the warranty claim. Id. at
203
204
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on the preemption issue reflected the deep ambivalence in legal circles
over the treatment of smokers’ health claims. On the one hand, the
decision did not provide the tobacco industry with the blanket protection it
had sought and ensured that the courtroom battles over manufacturer
liability for smoking-related illness would continue unabated. On the other
hand, it shielded the industry from several major claims. After examining
the language of the preemption provisions contained in the 1966 and 1969
cigarette labeling acts, the Court determined that only the 1969 act
preempted tort claims, and preempted only those asserting that the
company failed to adequately warn of the health hazards of smoking.208
The failure-to-warn claims included negligent failure-to-warn, strict
liability, and claims that the company had neutralized the impact of the
package warnings through its advertising.209 The Court ruled that the
claims not preempted were negligent testing and research,
misrepresentation claims not specifically relating to packaging or
advertising, and the express warranty claim.210
The preemption battle has become heated in toxic tort litigation in the
years since the Cipollone decision. Indeed, preemption is one of the most
important legal issues involving allegedly toxic products currently
confronting the bench and bar. Cipollone initiated the analytical process
for determining the relationship between personal-injury tort claims and
health-based federal legislation. The Supreme Court has subsequently
employed that analytical process in a variety of toxic product preemption
actions involving several statutes.
Thus, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, the Court held that the
express preemption provision in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)211 did not preempt most of the product liability
claims raised in the case, including claims for defective product design,
defective manufacturing, negligent testing, and express warranty.212 In
Bates, Dow brought a declaratory judgment action against farmers who
claimed that Dow’s pesticide, Strongarm, damaged their crops. Dow
555. Although this was the first plaintiff’s verdict in a tort action for smoking-related illness, the
victory proved short-lived. The Third Circuit remanded the case for a new trial on the basis of
erroneous jury instructions. Id. at 569. Still, the Cipollone verdict was another watershed event,
signaling the willingness of the public—as represented by the jury—to view the actions of the industry
negatively.
208
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524. The distinction between the Court’s interpretation of the 1966 act
and the 1969 act vis-à-vis preemption related to the change in language in the preemption provision.
Id. at 520. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision and its importance in cigarette litigation
generally, see Eggen, supra note 81, at 8–18.
209
See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 509, 524, 528.
210
Id. at 522, 524–27. Back in the district court for yet another trial, the former trial judge was
removed, and the plaintiff’s attorney withdrew. KLUGER, supra note 6, at 676–77. Subsequently, the
family decided not to pursue the case further. BRANDT, supra note 3, at 352.
211
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000).
212
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005).
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sought a determination that the farmers’ product liability claims would be
preempted by FIFRA.213 In its decision, the Court—in an opinion authored
by Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion in Cipollone—
directly followed its reasoning in Cipollone even though Bates involved a
different federal statute and property damage claims rather than personal
injuries.214
In 2008, the Court embraced Cipollone yet again in an important
product preemption decision, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.215 Riegel picks up
where the Court left off in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,216 with both cases
involving the preemption provision in the Medical Device Amendments
(MDA) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).217 In Lohr, the
Court had relied heavily on Cipollone in holding that none of the plaintiffs’
personal injury product liability claims was preempted.218 But in Riegel,
the Court seems to have moved even closer to Cipollone’s result, in which
some claims were deemed to be preempted and others not.219 The Court
leaned on Cipollone in ruling that the term “requirements” in a preemption
provision—one stating that no state requirements different from those
imposed under the relevant federal statute would be allowed—could
encompass common-law claims. The Court stated:
Congress is entitled to know what meaning this Court will
assign to terms regularly used in its enactments. Absent
other indication, reference to a State’s “requirements”
includes its common-law duties. As the plurality opinion
said in Cipollone, common-law liability is “premised on the
existence of a legal duty,” and a tort judgment therefore
establishes that the defendant has violated a state-law
obligation. And while the common-law remedy is limited to
damages, a liability award “‘can be, indeed is designed to be,
a potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.’”220
Even though Riegel involved a different statute, a textually different
213
Id. at 434–35. The farmers counterclaimed with claims based upon strict liability, negligence,
fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Practices-Consumer Protection Act.
Id. at 435–36.
214
See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 725, 747, 750–51 (2006) (“[T]he Court clearly was contemplating Cipollone and establishing
some consistency between that case and Bates.”).
215
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
216
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
217
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1999).
218
See Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494–502 (citing Cipollone, the Court held that the MDA did not preempt the Lohrs’ claims).
219
To a large extent, this movement is attributable to the composition of the Court in 2008.
220
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1008 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521–22
(1992)) (internal citations omitted).
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preemption provision, and different underlying purposes and policy goals,
the Court held that “there is nothing to contradict this normal meaning” of
the term “requirements” as it had been defined in Cipollone.221 The Court
went on to hold that claims based upon alleged defects in the defendant’s
cardiac balloon catheter were expressly preempted by the MDA because
the extensive premarket approval process that the device underwent
established specific health and safety requirements for the device that
potentially contradicted state tort liability.222
In Riegel, the Supreme Court used Cipollone as the legal standard for
express preemption, holding that the term “requirements” in a preemption
provision will be presumed to encompass liabilities under state common
law. This extension of Cipollone to other statutes is significant and may
have far-reaching implications. So far, however, preemption has not
extended to all claims related to smoking and health.
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in what
could prove to be an important test of Cipollone’s strength—and of the
tobacco industry’s power. In October 2008, the Court heard arguments in
Good v. Altria Group, Inc., in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed another aspect of cigarette labeling invoking the preemption
provision of the cigarette labeling act.223 The plaintiffs claimed that
defendant Philip Morris had used unfair and deceptive practices when it
sold certain “light” cigarettes or cigarettes advertised as containing
“lowered tar and nicotine.”224 The plaintiffs alleged that Philip Morris was
aware that smokers of these cigarettes unconsciously drew in more smoke
or covered ventilation holes so as to make up for the reduced amounts of
nicotine they otherwise would inhale; thus, the plaintiffs claimed that
Philip Morris’s labeling had materially misrepresented the cigarettes as
being a safer alternative for smokers.225 The First Circuit closely followed
the Cipollone decision in reversing the district court’s dismissal of the
claims226 and held that the cigarette labeling act neither expressly227 nor
impliedly228 preempted the claims. Furthermore, the court held that the
claims were not preempted by the Federal Trade Commission’s action on
light cigarette labeling, which was ambiguous at best and had not

221

Id.
Id. at 1011.
223
Good v. Altria Group, Inc., 501 F.3d 29, 30 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1119
(2008).
224
Id. at 30.
225
Id. at 31.
226
The district court had characterized the claims as failure-to-warn claims, rather than
misrepresentation and/or fraud claims. Accordingly, the district court followed the direct holding of
Cipollone and ruled that the claims were preempted by the labeling act. See id. at 33, 37.
227
Id. at 39.
228
Id. at 49.
222
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amounted to formal rulemaking.
Indisputably, Cipollone was a watershed event in preemption
jurisprudence, but what remains to be seen is the degree to which the case
has continued longevity. In Riegel, the Court continued to rely upon
Cipollone’s interpretation of “requirements” in the 1969 cigarette labeling
act’s express preemption provision to allow for the preemption of state tort
actions, and extended the force of Cipollone to other statutes with similar
language. But Good will demonstrate whether the Court will take a more
expansive position on preemption and move beyond Cipollone, either in
interpreting the scope of the cigarette labeling act’s preemption provision
or in applying implied preemption, or both.230 If the Court holds for Philip
Morris, it will move away from the direct holding in Cipollone. Either
way, the case has potential for far-reaching implications in other types of
product liability actions, involving other federal statutes. Furthermore, the
tobacco industry is still lobbying for some measure of regulation, this time
by the FDA.231 The regulation would presumably include a clear
preemption provision to shield it from liability.
In the wake of Good, it is possible that product preemption doctrine
will turn yet another corner with the potential result of restricting or
eliminating many common product claims. Indeed, the tobacco industry’s
strategy has proved to be a template for the approach of other industries
toward regulation when faced with the prospect of extensive tort liabilities.
In another important 2008 development, the United States Supreme Court
has granted certiorari in a pharmaceutical case in which the manufacturer
of the anti-nausea drug Phenergan has argued that a plaintiff’s state-law
tort claims are impliedly preempted by the FDCA, an act that does not
contain a preemption provision applicable to drugs. In Levine v. Wyeth,
the Vermont Supreme Court held that implied conflict preemption did not
bar the plaintiff’s claims.232 This case moves away from the express
229
See id. at 51–54 (discussing the preference of agencies to formulate policy through case-bycase adjudication rather than rulemaking).
230
Oral argument in the Good case was held on October 6, 2008. For the full transcript of the
argument,
see
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-562.pdf.
During argument, Justice Ginsberg questioned the attorneys on what the MSA said about deceptive
practices of the industry. See id. at 18, 36. Presumably, Justice Ginsberg thought the contents of the
MSA may have some impact on the preemption question before the court. Ultimately, Good will
reveal whether the Court will follow Cipollone directly or take it in a different direction.
231
See PHILIP MORRIS USA GOV’T. AFF., FDA & TOBACCO: WHERE WE STAND 32 (2008),
available at http://www.philipmorrisusa.com/en/cms/Responsibility/Government_Relations/Legislative
_Issues/pdfs/fda_and_tobacco.pdf.aspx (discussing the key legislative provisions of the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act).
232
Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 188–89 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008) (oral
argument held on Nov. 3, 2008). Contra Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008)
(holding that preemption bars the plaintiff’s action). For arguments against preemption of drug product
liability claims, see David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s
Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008), which discusses these
issues in light of the FDA’s new policy favoring drug claim preemption. But see Richard A. Epstein,
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preemption issues addressed in Cipollone and takes the product preemption
debate to the next level, that of implied preemption, and will possibly
expand preemption further. The arguments of the drug manufacturer in
Levine are the direct descendants of the arguments raised by the tobacco
industry in Cipollone, and will determine the scope and character of toxic
product litigation well into the future.
As 2008 wanes, the outgoing Bush administration has developed a
strategy to apply preemption expansively to many product claims. This
move is directly connected to the events documented by Brandt generally,
and to the administration’s dissatisfaction with the Cipollone line of cases,
which has continued to allow many product liability claims. Reports
indicate that administration officials have written approximately fifty rules
to bar product liability claims involving a broad array of products.233 The
current focus on preemption is testimony to the continued vitality of the
tort reform movement and to the legacy of the tobacco industry, whose
initial—and continuing—efforts have made preemption one of the most
significant legal issues of our time.
V. MASS TORT LITIGATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH GOALS
Another aspect of toxic tort law affected by the events detailed in The
Cigarette Century is mass toxic tort litigation. During the 1990s, the antitobacco bar turned its attention to the judicial system with mixed results.
Brandt declares, “[B]etween 1994 and 1997, more lawsuits were filed
against tobacco firms than in the previous thirty years.”234 Brandt gives the
impression that much of the impetus for resorting to the courts was the
frustrating efforts at regulation of tobacco. While this is true to some
extent, the situation was legally far more complex.
The increase in tobacco product liability lawsuits was a natural
outgrowth of the toxic tort phenomenon that took hold following the 1984
settlement of In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation235 and the
1986 settlement during trial of Anderson v. W.R. Grace,236 given household
recognition by the publication of Jonathan Harr’s book, A Civil Action.237
Toxic tort litigation became a recognizable feature of the legal landscape
Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to
Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT. L. 1 (2006), available at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss1/art5/
(arguing in favor of drug claim preemption).
233
Alicia Mundy, Bush Rule Changes Could Block Product-Safety Suits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15,
2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122403828537735379.html?mod=dist_smartbrief
(stating that the rules include “everything from motorcycle brakes to pain medicine”).
234
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 404.
235
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“Fairness
Opinion” approving settlement).
236
Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
237
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995).
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throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. A natural adjunct of this was an
increase in smoker suits and nonsmoker ETS suits. Developments in
asbestos litigation had driven the legal issues in toxic product liability suits
since the 1970s, particularly with respect to the application of the doctrine
of strict product liability, and plaintiffs were achieving success.238
Asbestos mass litigation reached epidemic proportions in the 1990s, with
attorneys and courts working to develop means to manage the influx of
claims. Accordingly, there was an increased interest in the use of the class
action device and other aggregative procedures to resolve mass tort
actions,239 many of which had public health implications.
Tobacco claims seemed uniquely suited to an aggregative device such
as the class action. Although the section on litigation in The Cigarette
Century is relatively small in relation to other sections of the book, it
demonstrates that the use of aggregative procedures was instrumental in
making litigation a formidable challenge for the otherwise impervious
tobacco industry. Brandt is correct in suggesting that the governmental
suits for reimbursement of public expenditures for smoking-related
illnesses arose primarily from a frustration over the lack of industry
regulation which resulted in high health costs for the states.240 He proceeds
to demonstrate the way in which these suits were affirmatively used to
apply pressure to the industry in an attempt to effect “global” regulation.
Although the 1997 global settlement ultimately failed—because it was
contingent upon Congress acting to implement its provisions, something
Congress declined to do—that agreement highlighted the conflicts within
the public health community over the advisability of negotiations with the
tobacco industry. As Brandt states:
[T]he proposed Global Settlement Agreement brought to
light an intense social and political debate about the role of
litigation in the tobacco wars and in the public health
generally. Some advocates saw litigation as incremental,
inefficient, and inappropriate. . . . Others saw the history of
congressional legislation as powerfully shaped, if not
corrupted, by industry interests and largesse, and viewed the
courts as the critical venue for public health reform.241
This debate within the tobacco public health community is a reflection of
the larger debate over the role of mass toxic tort litigation, a discussion that
238
See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for asbestos injury).
239
See Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass
Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1991) (discussing districtwide and nationwide class
actions).
240
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 412–13.
241
Id. at 425.
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is ongoing and heated.
Following Congress’s failure to enact the terms of the 1997 global
settlement, the states signed onto the newly negotiated MSA with the
tobacco industry in 1998. As previously discussed, the provisions of the
MSA had neither the scope nor the anticipated teeth that the 1997
agreement envisioned.243 The MSA contained what Brandt refers to as “a
chain of loopholes” that ultimately passed along the costs of the
agreement’s provisions to consumers and made the states more dependent
on tobacco money than they had previously been.244 The money received
by the states pursuant to the MSA contained no spending restrictions.
Thus, as Brandt documents, by 2005, only about four percent of the monies
received by the states had been used for tobacco control.245
The disappointment of the MSA highlighted some fundamental
problems with attempting to bring about public health regulation through
mass litigation. Other cases raise additional problems. In Castano v.
American Tobacco Company,246 a nicotine addiction case, the district court
had certified a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.247 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decertified the
class and held that the action could not be maintained as a class action
because the district court had abused its discretion in, among other things,
deciding that class questions predominated over individual questions.248 In
particular, the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court had not considered
the impact a class comprised of persons from all fifty states—representing
many different product liability regimes—would have on a trial on the
merits.249
While other areas of toxic torts have not gone the route of state
reimbursement suits, numerous efforts at bringing about comprehensive
“global” resolution of pervasive toxic tort litigation have met with
resistance and defeat. For example, in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus on the
matter of class certification in an action brought on behalf of thousands of
hemophiliacs who claimed to have received contaminated blood
242
For a discussion of the policies favoring and disfavoring use of aggregative procedures, with
particular discussion of asbestos litigation, see Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related
Cases: The Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231 (1991).
243
See supra notes 118–24 and accompanying text for discussion of the MSA.
244
BRANDT, supra note 3, at 432–33.
245
Id. at 435.
246
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425 (E.D. La. 1994).
247
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that questions of law or fact applicable to the class
predominate over those applicable only to individuals, and that the class action device be superior to
other procedural devices available to manage the litigation).
248
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
249
See id. at 741–43 (“The district court’s review of state law variances can hardly be considered
extensive; it conducted a cursory review of state law variations and gave short shrift to the defendant’s
arguments concerning variations.”).
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products. The court determined, among other things, that aggregation of
the actions into a class action was prejudicial to the defendant because it
had the effect of pressuring the company into settling the suit, even though
the company had won twelve of the first thirteen individual lawsuits that
had previously gone to trial on the same issue.251
Brandt does not discuss the disadvantages of using the class action
device for mass toxic torts or the swing of the judicial pendulum away
from embracing aggregative procedures. In toxic torts litigation, that trend
generally has made relief more difficult to achieve for plaintiffs. The class
action device has accumulated more negatives the more frequently it has
been used in mass tort actions, and particularly in mass product liability
litigation. Many members of the plaintiffs’ bar are cautious about seeking
class certification or advising their clients to join a class action if they
perceive that their clients may not receive a truly equitable share in a class
action settlement.252 There is no uniformly fair method for allocating
settlement payments in a class action, and even methods that use a special
master to determine fair compensation have their limits.253
Another reason for rejecting the use of class actions in mass product
liability litigation has been the fragmentation of questions of law and fact
among a large plaintiff class whose exposures and injuries arose at
different times and places and under different circumstances. In general,
many questions relating to the defendant’s conduct, the nature of the
product, and general causation can be decided on a class basis. Specific
causation and damages, however, are individual questions. As the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical
Corporation, “generalized proofs will not suffice to prove individual
damages.”254 Accordingly, the plaintiffs would have to separately prove
their individual damages, using their evidence of specific causation. In
certifying the Agent Orange class action, Judge Weinstein of the Eastern
District of New York held that the determination of whether the herbicide
was a defective product and whether the manufacturers had acted
250

In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1298.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 acknowledges that it may not be in the best interests of all
potential class members to join in a class action. In determining whether to certify a 23(b)(3) class
action, the rule asks the court to consider “the class members’ interest in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
253
See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 659–
88 (1989) (discussing the many factors that must be considered in settling a class action and comparing
the respective challenges of different mass tort cases).
254
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1200 (6th Cir. 1988). In Mertens v. Abbott
Labs., the court refused to certify a class action because individual proof of the harmful effects of
exposure to the drug DES would have to be shown by each class member. Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99
F.R.D. 38. 43 (D.N.H. 1983); see also Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1268 (Fla. 2006)
(“We conclude that continued class action treatment for Phase III of the trial plan is not feasible
because individualized issues such as legal causation, comparative fault, and damages predominate.”).
251
252
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negligently were issues capable of class resolution.
These class issues,
in the court’s estimation, outweighed the numerous individual issues of
exposure and injuries.256 As the Fifth Circuit noted in Castano, the
individual issues are amplified considerably when the choice-of-law
analysis determines that different states’ tort laws apply to class members
from different states.
In 2008, with these same concerns in mind, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals decertified a “light” cigarette class action alleging that the
tobacco industry violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)257 by misrepresenting the health benefits of its
products. In McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Company, the court held
that the putative class action “suffers from an insurmountable deficit of
collective legal or factual questions.”258 Although the plaintiffs argued that
the course of conduct alleged to violate RICO was conducted class-wide
by the tobacco industry, the court determined that each plaintiff had to
provide evidence on the issues of reliance, economic injury, and
damages.259
Such decisions raise the critical question: Should the class action
device be used at all in mass toxic tort litigation? The 1966 Advisory
Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 stated: “A ‘mass
accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages, but of liability and defenses to liability,
would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”260 While the
Committee was thinking only of single-accident situations, their words
apply equally, if not more forcefully, to the kind of mass product liability
actions of which the tobacco personal injury litigation is one example.
Still, the class action device can be useful in much mass toxic tort litigation
because the efficiencies can far outweigh the burdens.
Another anti-class action sentiment expressed by courts has been the
notion that class actions place undue pressure on defendants to settle.261
The Fifth Circuit emphasized this point in the Castano nicotine addiction
litigation:
In the context of mass tort class actions, certification
255

In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 722–23 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Id. at 722–24.
257
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000).
258
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 06-4666, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 7093, at *1, *3 (2nd
Cir. Apr. 3, 2008).
259
Id. at *14–*15.
260
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 1966 advisory committee’s note.
261
See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text for an illustration of this pressure in the
context of a class action brought by several thousand hemophiliacs who received contaminated blood
products.
256
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dramatically affects the stakes for defendants. Class
certification magnifies and strengthens the number of
unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it
more likely that a defendant will be found liable and results
in significantly higher damage awards.
In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certification
creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle,
whereas individual trials would not. The risk of facing an
all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even when
the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These
settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.262
The negative effect of this may be outweighed by the fact that per capita
awards in class action settlements are typically far less than payments
made pursuant to settlement agreements in individual actions.263
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressed
dissatisfaction with attempts to create the equivalent of a legislative
solution to mass torts through the mechanism of the courts. In Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the action was filed as a “settlement class
action,” along with a settlement agreement that had been previously
negotiated between representatives of the defendant asbestos
manufacturers and their insurers and representatives of some of the
plaintiff class members.264 The parties sought class certification and
approval of the settlement. The proposed settlement included a courtsupervised compensation scheme, which would have required class
members to apply for monetary awards, and set forth parameters for the
awards, including a ban on punitive damages and caps on compensatory
damages. In rejecting class certification, the Court observed: “The
argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims
processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means
262
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (citations omitted). The other side of this
argument is that the imbalance of resources between an individual and a large industry, such as the
tobacco industry, is corrected by a class action, which gives the individuals leverage against an industry
that would otherwise have a substantial advantage in resources and experience. See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 41 (1995).
263
A useful example is the Agent Orange litigation, in which the settlement approved by the court
provided for individual cash payments to class members for death and long-term total disability only,
with only class assistance available to others. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1396, 1410 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). That meant that each eligible class member would receive $12,000. John
C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the
Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 923 n.116 (1987) (generally analyzing the market
efficiency rationales of class actions). In contrast, an individual class member with a total disability
would not be limited to this small amount of damages in an individual lawsuit. Furthermore, injured
persons without total disability, if successful in their individual actions, would have had appropriate
money damages available.
264
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601–02 (1997).
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of compensating victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not
adopted such a solution.”265
Federal court hostility toward mass tort class actions has made the state
courts attractive to some litigants who perceive them as being more
receptive to the class action device. Thus, in In re West Virginia Rezulin
Litigation, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial
court should have certified a class action for drug product liability
claims.266 The class sought an order for medical monitoring, and the court
determined that common questions concerning the need for monitoring
predominated over individualized issues.267 Although the West Virginia
class action rule was identical to the federal rule, the court refused to
automatically follow related federal court decisions on mass tort class
actions.268
Congress has become involved in the debate over the use of the class
action device, enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).269
CAFA has had the effect of moving certain mass actions involving more
than one hundred persons into federal court, where the strictures of the
federal rules and Amchem would apply. CAFA demonstrates the power of
the business lobby,270 including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,271 which
pressed Congress to enact the legislation in response to widely publicized
reports from the American Tort Reform Foundation arguing that class
action abuses abound.272
The above developments, including the enactment of CAFA,
demonstrate the suspicion and even disdain with which the class action
device is viewed in some circles. To some degree, this was a result of
tobacco litigation; but the broader picture suggests that it was due to a
much larger array of mass tort litigation problems, most of which involved
alleged toxic substances. Brandt argues in favor of using aggregative
litigation to advance societal goals precisely because tobacco regulation
was not a political priority. Thus, in his opinion, the courts should be
265
Id. at 628–29; cf. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65 (1999) (holding improper
the certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) “limited fund” asbestos class action for many of the same
reasons as those stated in Amchem).
266
In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig., 585 S.E.2d 52, 58 (W. Va. 2006).
267
Id. at 72–73.
268
The court stated that its analysis was intended Ato avoid having our legal analysis of our Rules
>amount to nothing more than Pavlovian responses to federal decisional law.=@ Id. at 61.
269
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 14 (2005) (codified in 28 U.S.C. passim).
270
See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on
Plaintiffs in Mass-Tort Actions, 12 ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP., at 16 (Apr. 2005) (discussing
impetus for CAFA and provisions impacting plaintiffs in mass tort litigation).
271
See Letter from Bruce R. Josten, Executive Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Governmental Affairs, to U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2005/050218classactionletter.html (urging support of the “Class
Action Fairness Act”).
272
See AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004, at 43 (arguing for
class action reform).
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viewed as a workable alternative to achieve public health goals. Brandt
further argues that the judicial system is an important front on which public
health initiatives can be addressed: “Tobacco litigation—even when
plaintiffs lost—had a major impact on the larger social and political
debates about cigarette smoking, the industry, and responsibility for
harm.”273 The Cigarette Century demonstrates that the public health
achievements in relation to smoking were a combined effort on three
fronts—the scientific community, regulatory officials, and the courts.
Toxic torts generally have taken a lesson from that play-book.
VI. CONCLUSION
Events in the history of public health related to cigarettes have had farreaching implications in the law of toxic torts. Although Brandt’s The
Cigarette Century is specific to the tobacco industry and its related social
and legal circumstances, it serves to illuminate the major issues and
problems that are unique to toxic torts and that complicate efforts to
develop a law of toxic torts. To reflect on the events chronicled in The
Cigarette Century is to see clearly the source of the legal developments
and turmoil characteristic of toxic tort law in the twenty-first century.
Chief among these legal issues are the problems plaintiffs encounter in
attempting to demonstrate causation. As Brandt has shown in The
Cigarette Century, the history of the cigarette in the United States is
largely about the protracted process of scientific discovery and
investigation related to chronic latent illness. It is equally about the
industry’s resistance to the mounting evidence of its products’ hazards and
its public relations machine’s successful efforts to create a benign and
appealing image for the cigarette. The story of the cigarette in the
twentieth century combines public law and private law in a variety of
ways, but none more significantly than in legislation regarding the role of
cigarette warnings in the development of modern product preemption
doctrine. Finally, the efforts of attorneys and state attorneys general to use
aggregative litigation to achieve public health goals were an integral part
of an overall mass tort initiative that set up the ongoing debate over tort
reform and the respective roles of litigation and regulation in the public
health arena.
These issues resonate in current toxic tort litigation, and it is advisable
for the toxic torts legal community to heed their lessons. Brandt’s The
Cigarette Century is a prism through which attorneys, judges, and scholars
can look and learn to shape the future of toxic tort law.
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BRANDT, supra note 3, at 439.

